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This paper presents the EUCARS  3 model: a EUropean partial equilibrium CAR
emissions Simulation model. This model was originally developed to study CO2
emission limitation policies in passenger transport (Koopman, 1995). It was
subsequently expanded to extend its applicability to a variety of transport policy
questions. The model has, for example, been used to study the cost-effectiveness of
various measures aimed at limiting conventional emissions from cars as part of the
preparatory work of the Commission services for the Auto-Oil 1 Programme1 (EC,
1995a and 1995b). The differences between the previous versions and EUCARS 3 are
summarised in Annex 1.
The essential characteristic of the model is its partial equilibrium nature: all relevant
transport markets are modelled and cleared through prices. Both consumers and
producers are modelled as optimising agents who maximise utility and profits under a
variety of constraints (e.g. budget and time constraints). This structure allows an
assessment of the welfare effects of various policy measures, unlike other simulation
models that track the effects of transport policies on emissions and fuel use, but can
not assess the welfare costs of such measures (Samaras and Zierock, 1992; Acutt and
Dodgson, 1993). The welfare effects comprise the "full" costs and benefits of any
policy measure and the costs of both technological and behavioural change. The
welfare effects of changes in emission levels are, however, not modelled.2 Overall,
this model permits comparison of quite different policy measures and is well suited
for cost-effectiveness analyses of policies to reduce air emissions.
The structure of this paper as follows: first, a relatively informal presentation of the
general organisation of EUCARS is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 then presents a
detailed technical description of the functions and equations used. The reader who is
not interested in technical aspects of the model can skip this chapter without loss of
continuity, as the essential concepts have been explained in Chapter 2. Following
these conceptual chapters, Chapter 4 presents the main data sources of the model, and
the key elasticities used. More detailed information on these matters as well as on the
model’s calibration and operation can be found in a separate technical note (Denis,
1998). Chapter 5 briefly reports on a number of simulation experiments with the
model to give the reader an idea of its simulation properties. Finally, Chapter 6 sums
up some important findings and reports on possible future extensions.
                                                
1  Programme jointly launched by the European Commission, the automobile and fuel industries to study
the reduction of noxious emissions from road vehicles.
2  The TRENEN system of models is another example of models based on the welfare cost concept. The
valuation of changes in external costs is included in a broader welfare cost function (De Borger HWDO,
1996; De Borger HWDO, 1997).6
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The EUCARS model describes European passenger transport by car and public
transport. The focus of the model is on car transport, where a significant
disaggregation of the vehicle fleet is provided. Demand for public transport, vehicle
ownership and usage is modelled as the outcome of decisions by consumers and
producers on various interrelated markets. This implies that the key transport variables
(e.g. car mileage of various categories, travel times etc.) are endogenous and are
implicitly determined by exogenous price components (e.g. fuel prices, taxes),
infrastructure capacity and income. Vehicle emissions and congestion are determined
simultaneously and in function of these transport variables. All markets are cleared by
prices. This feature explains the equilibrium nature of the approach that has been
chosen. It is a partial approach, however, as only the transport markets are analysed,
and feedback on, for example, the labour market is ignored. These, in turn, could have
an effect on transport, but this is outside of the scope of EUCARS. With this FDYHDW in
mind, it can be said that the model allows an integrated evaluation of policy measures
on the demand for passenger transport, a variety of transport externalities (i.e. air
emissions, congestion) and welfare.
The overall structure of EUCARS is depicted in Figure 1 below. A number of
exogenous factors – for example, disposable income, infrastructure capacity and oil
prices, together with the system of transport taxation set by the government – are the
main input variables in producers' and consumers' decisions. The behaviour of
consumers and producers is described in individual blocks, which are interdependent.
Consumers make numerous choices when allocating disposable income to various
consumption categories. These choices are determined by the relative prices of the
various categories and by travel times, as consumers are also faced with a time budget.
Specific account is taken of public and private transport, various car types, and vehicle
age, as well as travel motives and location. The consumer choice procedure is
described in more detail in Section 2.2.
The demand for mobility is constrained by available infrastructure on the network
(disaggregated into urban roads at peak and off-peak time, rural roads and highways)
through generalised speed flow curves. This determines subsequent travel speeds,
which affect, in turn, the time costs of driving, the UHDO fuel consumption and transport
emissions, and also, through the impact on transport costs, demand for travel.
In the production block of the model, the technical characteristics (fuel consumption,
emission factors etc.) of new vehicles and fuels are determined. Producers are
assumed to develop vehicles to specifications that minimise consumers’ expectations
of lifetime costs. The assumptions and mechanisms of the production blocks are
presented and discussed in Section 2.3.7
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New car prices are determined by producers and are independent of the level of
production3. Given the prevailing new car prices, demand from the consumption block
equals the number of new cars sold during each period. For old vehicles (i.e. those
that are not produced during the current period) the second hand market price clears
the market as both the available stock and demand are price sensitive. The sensitivity
of demand results from the fact that car purchase prices affect car ownership costs,
which are among the determinants of demand (e.g. through depreciation). Supply is
influenced by prices through scrappage, which is partly endogenous. Higher second
hand market prices imply that repair following breakdown becomes relatively more
                                                
3 Economies of scale are less relevant in an aggregate model such as EUCARS than in models which
forecast sales by brand8
attractive and less cars are therefore scrapped. This subject is discussed in paragraph
2.4.
EUCARS has been designed to analyse the cost-effectiveness of various transport
policy measures in the context of air emission policy objectives. In order to assess the
costs, use is made of a welfare metric that expresses the (technical and behavioural)
cost of policy measures to society as a whole. This welfare metric, and possible
extensions, as well as the computation of car emissions (CO2 and conventional
emissions) are discussed in Section 2.5.
The EUCARS model is dynamic and calculates equilibrium outcomes on the transport
markets for five year periods, from 1990/1995 to 2010/20154.  Hence, these results
only take account of medium and long term policy effects and do not encompass
short-term fluctuations. The car fleet consists of vintages (by five year period). The
stock of old vehicles, which is handed over from one period to the next, links the
different periods. Consumers expectations of future costs are static (i.e. identical to
current costs). Moreover, when choosing new cars, consumers are assumed to be
short-sighted, i.e. they underestimate the future fuel savings they could make by
buying more fuel efficient cars. Therefore, the model is not time consistent (in the
sense that consumers do not have perfect foresight), and the equilibrium outcome is
calculated on a period by period basis.
The numerical results of the model simulation are, to a large extent, illustrative since
the model has not been estimated econometrically, but was calibrated on an
incomplete data set, representing EU-12 aggregates during the period 1985/1990.
Where possible, use has been made of the FOREMOVE database (Zachariadis, 1992)
and the underlying CORINAIR data to obtain information on the reference situation.
This applies in particular to the distribution of vehicle ownership and mileage across
vehicle categories, age groups, vehicle speeds and driving conditions. The relations
for fuel efficiency and emissions are also taken from COPERT/CORINAIR
(Eggleston  HWDO, 1991), while prices come from various sources, in particular the
results of a survey on car costs in different countries (SEO, 1992). The costs of
different vehicle technologies were obtained during the Auto Oil programme (Touche
Ross, 1995). The calibration of the model is further described in Denis (1998).
 7KHFRQVXPSWLRQEORFN
Consumer choices are described in the model by a decision tree. The idea underlying
the consumption block is that, in allocating their income, consumers first decide how
much to spend on large aggregates of goods and services (e.g. transport) and
subsequently on how these budgets are further subdivided into smaller aggregates (e.g.
private transport). This process continues until one arrives at the level of individual
goods and services (e.g. mileage of small cars purchased in 1990 driven on highways
for professional purposes). Hence, decision making is described as a series of
separable choices, which can be visualised as a nesting structure (decision tree) and is
presented in Figure 2.
                                                
4  The first period serves as the reference for calibration.9
All budget allocations are based on utility maximisation given income levels and
relative prices. The model has only one representative consumer who optimises
his/her welfare and is considered to be representative of all consumers in the
economy. Figure 2 therefore also represents the nested utility function of the
representative consumer (Section 3.1.2 describes the functional forms chosen, which
are indicated in the margin in Figure 2). 
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)LJXUH7KHFRQVXPSWLRQPRGXOHLQ(8&$56
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The impact of various measures on the distribution of income cannot be studied in models
with only one representative consumer. However, some insights about the distributive
effects of policy measures can be found by analysing the impact of measures on the
composition of the fleet (effects on small versus large, and new versus old, cars). Both the
nesting structure and the representative consumer are common characteristics of models of
this type, although their use in transport models has hitherto been limited. Another example
of this approach is the TRENEN system of transport models.
Income allocated in EUCARS is IXOO income, i.e. monetary income (salary, wages etc.) plus
the value of available time. The idea behind the latter concept is that time is scarce and,
therefore, represents a value. This feature is of major importance for transport choices, since
transport always implies time "costs". As is shown in the next chapter, this feature can be
captured in the model by using the concept of full income and prices that consist of both
monetary components and time costs.
The decision tree comprises nine levels, each of which represents a choice between
substitutable services. The only exception is the complementarity between a minimum level
of car usage and car ownership, which is modelled at the fifth and sixth level of the tree.
The functional forms that have been selected for the various nodes of the decision tree
(indicated in the margin of Figure 2) and the relevant parameters to which the model has
been calibrated are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
  Consumption expenditure is given outside the model. The first decision, therefore,
concerns the allocation of total consumption of QRQWUDQVSRUW goods and services, on the
one hand, and WRWDOWUDQVSRUWservices on the other, while the second choice is between the
consumption of SXEOLF transport services and of SULYDWH vehicle services. Note that total
transport services only refer to passenger transport. Public transport services are not further
sub-divided, and modal substitution therefore only occurs at the (aggregated) second level,
as the focus is on passenger transport by car in the remaining part of the decision tree.
The two succeeding levels refer to the type of car. At the third level, spending on private
vehicle services is allocated to five vehicle FDWHJRULHV or ³VL]H´FODVVHV. More information
on these classes is provided in Table 1.
7DEOH9HKLFOHFDWHJRULHVLQ(8&$56
Category Number of vehicles in 1990
(millions)
Small (gasoline, motor content £ 1400cc) 65.2
Medium (gasoline, 2000cc³ motor content>1400cc) 37.7
Large (gasoline, motor content > 2000cc) 7.3
Diesel 15.8
LPG 1.8
Total 127.8
Subsequently, at the fourth level, spending on these size classes is subdivided into spending
on vehicles of five age groups: cars produced during the current period (new cars, average
age 2.5 years), cars produced in the previous period (average age 7.5 years), cars produced
two periods ago (average age 12.5 years), cars produced three periods ago (average age 17.5 
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years) and cars that are older than 20 years. The distinction of various age groups - per size
category - is important as the emission profiles differ strongly across old(er) and new(er)
cars due to the progressive tightening of vehicle emission standards5. Table 2 presents the
age structure of the vehicle fleet in 1990.
7DEOH7KHDJHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHYHKLFOHIOHHW
Category Number of vehicles in 1990
(millions)
New  54.8
Aged 5-10 48.2
Aged 10-15 22.8
aged 15-20 1.9
Aged more than 20 0.1
Total 127.8
Up to this point in the model, spending on the various vehicle categories has been
formulated as spending on both car ownership and usage. The shares of "ownership" and
"usage" cost in this total are not fixed as annual mileage can be varied. However, demand
for ownership and usage is also strongly interlinked at the level of the individual consumer.
Optimising consumers take joint decisions on ownership and usage: people buy cars to use
them (De Jong (1989, 1991)). Therefore, at the aggregate level, fuel costs not only affect
mileage, but also ownership (people with low annual mileage who are given an incentive to
reduce mileage further are, to some extent, also dissuaded from owning a car). Conversely,
fixed costs not only affect the number of cars purchased, but also the total mileage driven by
the fleet (less cars also implies less kilometres driven).
At the fifth and sixth levels of the decision tree, this strong relationship between the demand
for car ownership and car usage is modelled. At the fifth level it is assumed that ownership
of a private vehicle automatically implies a minimum usage of that vehicle which is set at
35% of the average annual mileage (the choice of an exact value for this parameter is related
to the model properties, see Chapter 4). Hence, consumers allocate their spending between,
on the one hand, car ownership (and the associated minimum usage of the vehicle) and, on
the other hand, the free or supplementary usage of those vehicles. These two "services" are
labelled FRPPLWWHG and VXSSOHPHQWDU\ car services, respectively. Gross complementarity
has been assumed here, i.e. an increase in the price of one category not only entails a drop in
demand for this category, but also for the other category6. At the sixth level, the FRPPLWWHG
part of car services is split into RZQHUVKLS and committed mileage. As the minimum mileage
“bought with the car” has been fixed, no substitution possibilities have been modelled at
                                                
5  The phasing in of the various emission standards over time does not correspond perfectly to the age categories
distinguished in EUCARS, implying that some vehicles meeting a certain emission standard belong to different
age groups. In order to allow a relatively precise calculation of the emissions, a transition matrix between age
groups and vehicle technologies has been constructed (see Denis, 1998).
6  This formulation implies that when fixed costs increase, total mileage decreases. It is implicitly assumed that the
decrease in kilometres associated with the reduction in car ownership (a process occurring at the micro level)
outweighs the increase in “free” kilometrage of vehicles that remain in the vehicle fleet. 
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this level. Subsequently, the committed mileage is combined with the free (VXSSOHPHQWDU\)
mileage to obtain the total XVDJH
At this level, fleet composition and annual mileage per vehicle are fixed. Further
subdivisions concern the allocation of mileage among various trip motives, locations and
time of day. At the seventh level, mileage is distributed across three trip types that
correspond to travel motives: commuting, professional usage and other (private use). This
distinction is important as the value of time differs strongly across these activities according
to available studies. Moreover, the price sensitivity of these trips also varies: professional
and commuting trips have lower price elasticities than private trips.7
Finally, at the eighth and ninth levels, mileage for the different trip types is allocated to four
types of driving conditions (peak urban, off peak urban, rural roads and highways). These
proportions are nearly fixed (low elasticity of substitution between locations), except for the
substitution between peak and offpeak periods which is considered easier. Information for
rural roads and highways on further differentiation according to the period of the day is
difficult to obtain and less relevant. The average driving speeds resulting from traffic are
different in these four situations, which affect the time costs of driving and, consequently,
demand.
The order in which the different choices are organised can be discussed; in particular the
question arises whether the different trip motives and location alternatives should not come
earlier in the decision tree. However in that case, emphasis would be on “trips” and it would
consequently be more difficult to model the composition of the fleet and of mileage. Also
less emphasis would be given to modelling vehicle characteristics which are of considerable
importance to fleet emissions, and so better considered at an upper level (although there are
some obvious interactions between trip characteristics and car type). Consequently, greater
accuracy can be expected from evaluating fiscal, regulatory and other policies impacting the
vehicle fleet rather than modelling policies that affect local driving conditions. Another
question is whether further disaggregation should be included, for example a distinction
could be made on the basis of car occupancy rates, which would allow the impact of
policies on car-pooling to be taken into account. As mentioned before, the public transport
bundle could also be further disaggregated.
 7KHSURGXFWLRQEORFN
Cars can be made more fuel-efficient and less polluting at a cost. By changing the
technology (e.g. improved catalytic converters) and materials used, vehicle emissions can be
reduced. According to the available literature, fuel economy and conventional emissions
(e.g. NOx, CO) are practically unrelated and a reduction in emissions does not always
increase fuel consumption (as was the case following the introduction of the catalytic
converter).  Moreover, reductions in emissions are often obtained after the combustion
process (catalytic converters), which also separates the two problems physically8.  The
                                                
7  This distinction also opens up the possibility (not exploited in the current model version) of taking differences in
the fiscal treatment of these trips into account (e.g. tax deductibility of the costs of commuting).
8 Personal communications by Ashley Fergusson and UBA 
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model therefore has two separate modules for vehicle technology: one for fuel efficiency
and one for emission reduction technologies. In addition, a separate module deals with fuel
quality. At present, no interactions between fuel quality and vehicle technology are included
in the model, but this could in principle be easily remedied.
The main feature underlying both modules is that producers select technical characteristics
of the various vehicle categories so that the models they put on the market correspond to
consumers’ preferences, given prevailing taxes, interest rates, fuel prices, other cost
components, mileage and emission standards (if relevant). Such an outcome would prevail
given sufficient competition amongst vehicle manufacturers.  It is also assumed that for
each technology average costs are independent of the scale of production, a reasonable
assumption in a model of this nature. This also implies that any cost increases (taxation or
technological add-ons) are fully passed to consumers. As a result, producers will specify
their product to match consumers expectations of financial savings, and vehicle producers
effectively compare the cost of producing a cost-saving device (e.g. of lighter materials
leading to lower fuel use per kilometre) with the cost savings that are perceived by the
consumer as a result.
A critical assumption in this respect is that consumers are somewhat myopic. This
hypothesis concerns the perception consumers have of lifelong cost savings from switching
to technologies that save costs over time: they are assumed to be short-sighted, i.e. they do
not take real lifetime costs or benefits into account. Their choice is therefore suboptimal
when compared to the fuel economy that would be chosen under rational expectations about
future costs (Train, 1985) and, due to the above assumption, the production outcome (set of
emission factors and related costs) is also suboptimal, which in turn implies the existence of
no-regret measures that would correct for this market failure.9
Consumers and producers base their decisions regarding fuel economy on fuel prices
inclusive of taxes.  The fuel tax wedge should, in principle, lead to distortions in levels of
fuel economy from the point of view of society as a whole.  Efficient levels of fuel economy
should be based on the resource (and environmental) costs of fuel.  Due to high fuel tax
levels, decisions by consumers and producers with perfect foresight would result in an
“overprovision” of fuel economy.  However, consumer myopia works in the other direction,
i.e. consumers and producers are less price sensitive on account of this phenomenon.  In
EUCARS 3, consumer myopia is so strong that, with respect to the existing high fuel taxes,
there is an “underprovision” of fuel economy in the base case. Although this might seem
counter-intuitive, it is borne out by the available evidence on the marginal costs of
improvements in fuel economy presented in Section 3.4.
For each of the five size categories, average costs and technical characteristics of new
vintages are determined in the production block, according to these two important
assumptions. Finally, different combinations of diesel and petrol fuel quality are
distinguished in the fuel quality module of EUCARS.  Subject to possible standards, the
least cost combination is selected by refineries.  Differential taxation based on fuel
characteristics can be simulated. Through consumer choice, this affects the different
diesel/petrol combinations produced over a certain period.
                                                
9  See for instance Eriksson (1993) for an application to road traffic. 
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Fuel economy of the various size classes can be adjusted over a relatively wide range, in
small steps. It is consequently modelled as a continuous cost-minimisation problem.
Reducing conventional emissions is modelled as a discrete cost-minimisation problem. In
view of the limited number of distinct technologies available, the selection process consists
of a discrete choice by size class.  The same holds for the selection of fuel quality. In all
cases, emission standards can be introduced and imply an upper emission limit on eligible
technologies.
A more detailed discussion of the modules is provided in Chapter 3.
 3ULFHIRUPDWLRQFDUPDUNHWVHQGRJHQRXVVFUDSSDJHDQGPRGHOG\QDPLFV
As prices balance supply and demand on all markets, the price formation process is crucial
to the simulation properties of the model. Prices for usage are determined at the bottom end
of the decision tree discussed in Section 2.2 above. Ownership prices are determined at
level six of the same decision tree. They are subsequently aggregated to prices at higher
levels in the decision tree in a manner that is consistent with the underlying demand
structures at each level (see Section 3.1.3).
8VDJHFRVWV
The usage prices depend essentially on monetary cost components on the one hand, and
time costs on the other. The time costs are a simple function of travel speeds (determined by
the speed flow curves) and value of time (which are exogenous to the model).
The monetary cost components firstly comprise exogenous factors like maintenance, oil use
etc, which vary across size and age categories. Secondly, they consist of fuel costs, which
depend on fuel prices (tax included) and fuel efficiency. Fuel efficiency varies with the
technical characteristics of the vehicle and driving conditions.
2ZQHUVKLSFRVWV
Ownership costs are modelled as the sum of running expenses (to the extent that these are
independent of mileage) and capital costs, as the full costs of owning a vehicle during the
period under consideration.
The model distinguishes four individual components: exogenous ownership costs (e.g.
vehicle insurance), ownership taxes (annual road tax or “circulation tax”), depreciation and
capital costs (net of depreciation). For a new car, the last term covers both interest foregone
on car ownership and capital gains/losses (i.e. differences between the book value (purchase
price minus depreciation) of a car and second hand prices). Clearly, annual taxes have a
direct impact on ownership costs, whereas purchase taxes affect ownership costs indirectly
through depreciation. Depreciation is linear and depends uniquely on the age of the car (i.e.
not on mileage). The latter simplifying assumption seems reasonable in an aggregate model
of this kind where, due to the gross complementarity between ownership and usage, annual
mileage is relatively stable in simulations. 
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7KHFDUPDUNHWV
The car markets are cleared through car prices, which are different to the ownership costs
outlined above. Price determination is different for new and for second-hand cars. New car
prices are set by producers operating at constant average cost, implying that supply is
perfectly elastic. Hence, new car ownership is essentially dependent on demand10.
Box 1.  A DYNAMIC MODEL
* Periods of five years
*  One model run by period
* Periods linked via vintages and expectations
&DUVWRFNEURNHQGRZQE\YLQWDJHV
PeriodW PeriodW PeriodW
income t+1
price t+1
income t+2
price t+2
NEW
M1
NEW
M4
M3
M2
M1
M4
M3
M2
M1
NEW
M4
M3
M2
aged 0-5
aged 5-10
aged 10-15
aged 15-20
aged 20-
- scrappaget+1
- scrappaget+1
- scrappaget+1
- scrappaget+1
- scrappaget+1
- scrappaget+2
- scrappaget+2
- scrappaget+2
- scrappaget+2
- scrappaget+2
For car ownership of old vehicles (those not produced during the current period), supply
depends on the stock of the previous period and scrappage. Scrappage itself is partly
endogenous. The exogenous part represents "total losses" which are assumed equivalent to
one third of total scrappage in the base year. Exogenous scrappage occurs at an increasing
rate with the age of the car. Endogenous scrappage is important as measures that directly
affect car prices, such as purchase and/or circulation taxes, are known to have a significant
impact on the average age of the fleet. A good example is Denmark where relatively very
high purchase taxes have led to high car prices across the board and an average vehicle age
that is more than one year above the European average.
                                                
10  Strictly speaking in a simultaneous model like EUCARS all relations are interdependent and one should,
therefore, qualify all statements as to uni-causal relations (x determines y). Here, for example, demand levels
influence driving and congestion, this affects prices and demand. 
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Box 1 above visualises the scrappage process and indicates that scrappage decisions have
long-lasting effects on the composition of the vehicle fleet. The – partly endogenous –
turnover of the vehicle fleet implies that the model is dynamic.
0RGHOG\QDPLFV
The model describes medium term (five year) equilibria of passenger transport markets.
However, as vehicles have an average lifetime of some 11 years, expectations play an
important role in determining the results of the model. In all cases, it has been assumed that
consumers and producers have static expectations, i.e. that prices and average traffic
volumes in future periods will correspond to those in the current period. This assumption
greatly simplifies the computation of results as the model can be solved on a period by
period basis. However, this feature also implies that the model is not "time consistent" in the
sense that consumers do not have forward looking expectations and are not capable of
taking futureHTXLOLEULD into account when making decisions. Theoretically, the use of static
expectations in the context of optimising models is not correct. However, it should be noted
that, as time periods represent five year intervals, feedback from future to current periods
(which in themselves are second order effects) are, in a quantitative sense, probably not so
important, especially given the myopic assumption adopted to describe consumer
“investment” behaviour. Furthermore, the authors are not aware of any disaggregated
dynamic transport model, with optimising consumers and producers, into which perfect
foresight has been incorporated.
 (YDOXDWLRQRISROLF\VFHQDULRVZLWK(8&$56
EUCARS is used in simulation exercises where policy scenarios are evaluated by
comparison to a baseline scenario. The baseline scenario builds upon the reference situation
(EU-12 in 1990) to which the model is calibrated, and is then established by fixing income
and infrastructure growth for the future periods, leaving standards and fiscal instruments
unchanged.11 Once the baseline scenario is obtained, evaluations of simulations are made on
the basis of welfare costs. The welfare “yardstick” integrates all the major social costs
components described below: consumer welfare, producer welfare and government
revenues, excluding the effects the measures can have on environmental, noise and accident
externalities.
Consumer welfare obviously depends on the levels of consumption, and changes in welfare
are measured through the nested utility function depicted in Figure 2, which relates utility to
the consumption levels of the two largest consumption categories in the model: transport
services and non-transport goods and services. These aggregated consumption levels are
related to lower level consumption through sub-utility functions. The structure of the utility
function is such that a doubling of the consumption levels of both categories leads to a
doubling of welfare. On the other hand, if at the prevailing prices the quantities of both
consumption categories are altered while respecting the budget constraint, then utility
obviously falls (for more information see Section 3.8).
                                                
11  Information on baseline specifications and outcome is to be found in the technical document. For the versions
used in the Auto-Oil programme, FOREMOVE projections of the fleet evolution were taken as the baseline
reference scenario to be approached. 
20
The prices that determine the consumption levels at the top level of the decision tree are
aggregates of prices at lower levels. Expenditure shares, updated between periods, are used
as weights in the aggregation process (see Chapter 3 for more detail). This means that if
substitution possibilities at low levels of the decision tree are significant, the impact of price
increases on welfare will be limited, as greater shares of categories in which prices do not
increase imply that price increases at the highest level of aggregation are mitigated. It should
be noted that changes in travel times due to modifications in traffic volumes also affect
prices through modified time costs.
Losses in consumer welfare can be calculated in each period by analysing the so-called
equivalent variation, i.e. the increase in income (at baseline prices) that would be needed to
keep utility at baseline levels following a policy change.
Given the assumptions made in the production block, producer welfare would not change in
the simulations as prices equal costs and profits are not affected.
Social welfare, excluding the effects of measures on environmental and accident
externalities, can therefore be calculated as the sum of the change in consumer welfare and
the change in tax revenues (if any). It is assumed that changes in tax revenues from the no-
policy case are returned to the economy in a lump-sum way, which implies that their
contribution to welfare is one ECU for one ECU of revenue12 Obviously, if the money were
used to cut highly distortionary taxes then its “welfare contribution” would be higher.
Conversely, if the money were spent on projects that have a low social benefit, the
contribution of the tax revenues to societal welfare would be smaller. In the absence of
additional information on the use of additional tax revenues, it is standard to assume lump
sum recycling. Sensitivity analyses can easily be performed by varying the value for the
contribution to welfare of revenues collected (Marginal Cost of Public Funds, or MCPF).
Only changes in tax revenues from the transport sector are taken into account.
These changes in societal welfare can, for presentational purposes, be expressed as a
percentage of baseline spending on transport for each period. Alternatively, they can be
discounted over the full simulation period to obtain the cumulated welfare change.
When policy simulations are run with the model, these welfare changes can be used to carry
out a cost-effectiveness study. In such a study, an (environmental) objective is fixed and a
variety of policy scenarios are run to determine the least cost policy instrument. In such
exercises, the welfare metric is used to determine the costs. For example, in European
Commission (1995c) a set of simulations is reported, which aim at reducing CO2 emissions
from passenger transport by 10% from baseline. The results reported suggest that the least
cost way of obtaining this result is the imposition of a CO2 tax.
                                                
12 This is obviously a rough approximation since transport taxes affect the price of consumption goods and thereby
distort the labour-leisure choice as a result of which welfare losses occur outside of the transport system.  This
means that part of the recycling is required to offset these welfare losses and that therefore, the total welfare
effects are somewhat more negative than the welfare effects measured in EUCARS. 
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 '(7$,/(''(6&5,37,212)7+(02'(/
This chapter gives a detailed discussion of the structure of individual blocks of the model,
the main equations and their derivations. Equations are given in a somewhat simplified
form; i.e. not all indices/subscripts are explicitly written as the main emphasis is on
describing the principles. A complete list of equations is to be found in Annex 3 (model
listing), while the list of all symbols used in the model appears in Annex 2.
 &RQVXPSWLRQEORFN
 *HQHUDOLVHGFRVWVDQGIXOOLQFRPH
The consumption block describes the allocation of available income by a representative
consumer over consumption categories by means of a nested choice process. As transport
activities take time and time is scarce, decisions as to the structure of consumption also
imply an allocation of available "consumption" time (i.e. time that is not used for working,
resting etc.). Hence, time "costs", together with monetary costs enter directly into the
decision process. Utility is maximised by selecting the “optimal” mix of goods and
(transport) services, respecting the budget and time constraints.
This can be analysed by considering the following setting for the utility optimisation:
() ,... , , , 2 2 1 1 7; ; 7; ; 8 0D[
s.t.
< ; 3 ; 3 £ + + ... 2 2 1 1 (budget constraint; associated Lagrangian multiplier: l)
  7 ; W ; W £ + + ... 2 2 1 1 (time constraint; associated Lagrangian multiplier: m)
  L L L ; W 7; =
in which:
L ; passenger mileage with mode L
L 7; travel time with mode L
L 3 monetary costs per unit (e.g. kilometre) of mode L
L W travel time per unit (e.g. kilometre) of mode L
< monetary budget
7 available "consumption" time
The first order conditions that follow from maximising the associated Lagrangian are:
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Dividing both sides by l gives: 
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This expression has an interesting interpretation as the left-hand side clearly represents the
monetary value of an additional unit of  L ;  (recall that l stands for the marginal utility of
income) i.e. the marginal benefit. The right-hand side can be understood as the sum of
monetary costs ( L 3 ) and time costs expressed in monetary-equivalents (ml equals the
marginal money value of time and that the second term between brackets represents a mode
specific utility cost expressed in monetary terms) and, thus, represents the generalised cost
of travel ( L &; ).  In the optimum the marginal benefits of and additional unit of  L ;  equal
the marginal cost.
One can subsequently reformulate the optimisation procedure by using the concept of
generalised costs as defined above, as well as the associated concept of Full Income (),).
Full Income represents the monetary income < plus the monetary equivalent of the
endowment in consumption time (determined by multiplying the various  L 7;  by the
respective value of time). This leads to the following optimisation problem:
  () ,... , 2 1 ; ; 8 0D[
s.t.
), ; &; ; &; £ + 2 2 1 1
It can easily be demonstrated that the first order conditions of this problem are identical to
those of the former optimisation problem. In EUCARS the latter, reduced, approach is
followed. Thus, income is full income and prices contain both a purely monetary component
as well as a component reflecting the value of time. The various demand systems are
derived by maximising the sub-utility functions, given full income and generalised prices.
An important consequence of the use of generalised prices including time costs is that
congestion costs are included in the welfare metric.
 6XEXWLOLW\IXQFWLRQV
As indicated by Figure 2 the consumption block consists of a nested structure of sub-utility
functions with nine levels. The nested structure, by assuming separable choices, allows one
to limit the number of cross price elasticities to be estimated. When choices occur between
substitutable services, the functional form is CES (constant elasticity of substitution) and
the substitution elasticity is indicated on the decision tree; other functional forms are used to
model joint demand of car ownership and usage.
&(6GHPDQGV\VWHPV
Of the nine levels, the first four are modelled by a CES function. The CES function is also
used at level seven eight and nine (distribution of mileage over trip motives, locations and
periods of the day). 
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The expression for the CES utility function for the case of five consumption categories
(which occurs at levels 3 and 4 in the model) is written as follows:
[]
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in which s represents the elasticity of substitution and a is a share parameter.13 Utility
maximisation under the restriction of the budget equation
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The expression for the (own) price elasticity parameters is:
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since the income elasticity of demand is equal to 1.)
The cross price elasticities are given by:
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Therefore, the cross price elasticities are positive for the first four levels in the model tree
(substitutable services), while they are negative for the bottom levels (7, 8, 9) with very low
substitution possibilities ( 5 . 0 £ s ; 0 = s  would correspond to the Leontief function with
                                                
13  The traditional presentation scales the utility function by imposing  1
1
= åL L
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(see for instance Shoven and
Whalley, 1992). We do not use the same scaling factor here. 
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fixed shares of each component). At level 7, the distinction between trip motives is to be
understood as decomposition into services with a different value and with varying
composition. Obviously at the individual level, there is no or very little direct substitution
between the three alternatives when market conditions change14. However the differentiated
increase or decrease in mileage according to trip motives can change the eventual
proportions.
For level 8, it is easily understandable that the substitution possibilities between rural,
highway and urban locations are limited: on balance, as trips often consist of using various
stretches of the different networks, there is a strong complementarity between these three
services.
Clearly, CES is in itself a fairly restrictive demand system for studying consumption
behaviour as it implies unitary income elasticities and a constant elasticity of substitution
that determines the own and cross price elasticities at individual levels of the consumption
block.15 This substitution elasticity is the only parameter whose value is “free” and can be
determined in the calibration process. However, it should be noted that the overall implicit
price elasticities of individual consumption categories (at the lowest level of disaggregation)
depend on the parameters at DOO levels of the consumption block, which allows for a much
higher degree of flexibility in the overall modelling process (see Section 4.1).
Aggregate prices are determined using a CES price aggregator (see below).
/(6GHPDQGV\VWHPV
The joint demand for car ownership and usage is modelled in levels 5 and 6 of the decision
tree. The fifth level – the distinction between committed services purchased with the car and
free or supplementary usage - has been modelled by means of a /(6/LQHDU([SHQGLWXUH
6\VWHP function. This utility function, which allows for the existence of gross
complementarity between the components, is written as follows for the case of two
dependent variables:
() ()
2 1
2 2 1 1
a a b b - - = T T X
with  T￿T￿ the quantities consumed of the two goods,
X  utility
  ai, bi > 0 (i = 1,2) , and a1 + a2 = 1 .
Utility maximisation leads to the following demand equations, for the case of two variables
and more than two variables, respectively:
T￿ b￿a￿\S￿b￿S￿b￿S￿
                                                
14  It is difficult to imagine a scenario where the price of the alternatives would not move together, even if not in
proportion.
15  Keller (1976) proposed to use "modified CES" functions in comparable decision tree. "Modified CES"
functions impose minimal quantities and are more flexible than the classic CES functional form. 
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TL bLaL\S
NSNbNSL
Income elasticity is equal to( L aL \  S ￿T￿ . Its value has been fixed at 1.2 for
supplementary mileage, and approximately 0.85 for committed services (ownership and
minimum mileage). This latter elasticity diminishes with the age of the car. For (own) price
elasticity, the equation is (LL bLaLTLTLValues are close to –1 because of parameter
specification. Cross price elasticities (general formula is:(LM aLbMSMSLTLare close to
zero
/HRQWLHIGHPDQGV\VWHPV
At level 6 demand depends in fixed proportions on demand at the previous level, i.e. car
usage consists 100% of supplementary mileage, plus the (compulsory) mileage associated
with ownership. The Leontief function implies substitution elasticity equal to zero. There is
therefore no change in the relative proportion of the two goods/services following a change
in relative prices.
It is the combination of the LES function (complementarity) with the association of
minimum mileage to car ownership, as modelled by the Leontief function, that ensures the
strong complementarity between ownership and mileage (see Chapter 4 and 5 for an
indication of model properties in this respect).
 3ULFHDJJUHJDWLRQLQWKHFRQVXPSWLRQEORFN
In EUCARS, prices of car transport services are determined at the lowest levels of
aggregation of the consumption block (i.e. levels nine and six). Variable costs per km
(3&76*$75, i.e. 3rice to the &onsumer, at a specific period of 7ime, for a particular 6ize,
*eneration and $spect of car services for a specific 7ravel motive on a specific 5oad class)
are aggregated from level nine, then they are combined with fixed cost (3&76*$ownership) at
level  5. These prices are the generalised costs defined above and their composition is
described in further detail in the next section.
The aggregates at the higher level cannot be interpreted as total costs but rather as price
indices. For instance, the aggregation of prices in the CES demand systems uses the price
index for a CES function:
33 LL L =
- å
- a
s s 1
1
1  where the a's and the s's are the same coefficients and
elasticities of substitution as in the demand equations.
For the LES function a geometrical average has been used:
3S N
Z
N
N =Õ     with ZN, share of k in the budget.
The price aggregation for the Leontief demand systems uses simple weighed averages.
 *HQHUDOLVHGFRVWVDQGFDUPDUNHWV
The generalised cost of car traffic services consists of a monetary component and a time
cost component. The latter component is determined endogenously as the product of the 
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value of time (9D27: exogenous) and the travel time (7LPH: endogenous) under the different
driving conditions. The costs of car ownership depend largely on the market prices for new
and (four age categories of) old cars through depreciation and the use of capacity costs.
*HQHUDOLVHGFRVWVRIFDUXVDJH
The generalised cost of car usage or variable cost consists of three components:
3&76*$75usage = 9&(  +  )()) * (3)8(/ +9&3) * (1 + 9$7))  +  9D27 * 7LPH.
Where - 9&( is the exogenous component of variable costs (reflecting oil use, mileage
dependent insurance etc.)16,
- )())is the (endogenous) fuel use per kilometre,
- 3)8(/ is the price net of taxes for a specific fuel type,
- 9&3 are the fuel excises, and 9$7) is the VAT rate (%),
9$7)is the value added tax
This equation is replicated 300 times (five vehicle categories; five age groups, three trip
motives and four driving conditions) in the model as some of the components differ for the
individual vehicle categories, trip motives and driving conditions. Table 3 presents the value
of the components in the reference situation for selected trips. The relatively high costs of
urban peak commuting should be noted, largely the result of a relatively high value of time
for commuting and low travel speeds during the peak hour.
7DEOH([DPSOHVRIXVDJHFRVWVLQWKHUHIHUHQFHVLWXDWLRQ
Type of car Type of trip VCE value
(Ecu/100km)
Fuel use
(Ecu/100km)
Time costs
(Ecu/100km)
Total
cost
Small gasoline
New
Rural
private
3.24 3.71 5.18 12.13
Small gasoline
10-15 y old
Urban offpeak
private
4.75 7.52 12.26 24.53
Large gasoline
more than 20 y
Highway
Business
11.22 6.40 12.58 34.20
Diesel
New
Rural
Private
6.98 2.05 5.26 14.30
Diesel
New
Urban peak
Commuting
6.98 5.03 21.92 33.93
                                                
16  Parking costs are not explicitly modelled in EUCARS, but can easily be incorporated in the model framework.
This could significantly affect the analysis of policies targeting urban traffic (see Van Dender HWDO, 1997). 
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&RVWVRIFDURZQHUVKLS
Ownership costs vary with the type and age of the car. All the equations should therefore be
indexed with the car type (V subscript, see Table 1), while differentiation due to vintage is
explained in the text. Ownership costs follow a capital cost approach and comprise two
exogenous parameters together with two endogenous variables:
3&76*$ownership = )&( + )&3 + '(35 + &$3&.
Where: - )&( is the exogenous component in the fixed cost of cars,
- )&3 is the annual road tax (“circulation” tax),
- '(35 and &$3& are the depreciation and capacity costs (see equations below).
For new cars, it is assumed that the total depreciation of a new car over a five-year period
amounts to 60% of its original value:
'(35 = 0.6 1&3&
where 1&3& is the purchase price (tax incl.) of the new car.
For old cars, it is assumed that the average five-year-old car still has six years of economic
"life" at the beginning of each period:
'(35m1 = 5 * (2&03 m1 / 6)
where 2&03m1 stands for the second-hand price of this type of car. In view of the average
11 year lifetime of cars, this hypothesis is a reasonable approximation in period t for
vehicles purchased in period t-1. For cars belonging to older generations (i.e. 10 years and
older) it is assumed that the expected lifetime at the beginning of the period is shorter than
five years. Consequently they are fully depreciated during the period ('(35mi = 2&03mi
for i=2,3,4).
The capacity cost is calculated as the opportunity cost of capital. The opportunity cost of
capital equals the interest rate (L), times the “book value” of the car. The latter variable
decreases over time, due to depreciation (which is assumed linear). Therefore, the capacity
cost for one period is equal to17:
&$3& =  L * (5 2&03 – 2 '(35)
                                                
17  Starting from the second-hand car price,  the DQQXDO capacity cost can be calculated as (&$3&\):
&$3&\      = L * 2&03
&$3&\ = L * (2&03 - '(35\)
&$3&\ = L (2&03 - 2 '(35\)
&$3&\ = L * (2&03 - 3 '(35\)
&$3&\ = L * (2&03 - 4 '(35\)
where \ is the year and '(35\ the annual depreciation (i.e. one fifth of '(35, the total depreciation per
period). The costs for the five years are summed in order to arrive at the total capacity cost per period. To
simplify the relations no intra-period discounting has been applied. 
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Applying it to the different vintages we obtain &$3&m1￿= L  * 20/6 2&03m1 for vehicles
belonging to the vintage of cars introduced in the previous period, and
&$3& = L * (5 2&03 - 2 '(35) = i * 3 2&03
for all other old vehicles. When calculating the capacity costs for new cars, the result is:
&$3& =  L * 3.8 1&3&+ (0.4 1&3& – 2&03m1)
given that the relevant price is the new car price (1&3& instead of 2&03), and that the
annual depreciation is equal to 0.6/5 1&3&. The final term records the difference between
the residual “book value” of the car at the end of the period (0.4 1&3&) and the price of the
same vehicle on the second-hand car market, as this latter price is the relevant indicator of
the value of the asset at the beginning of the next period18.
However, this equation uses current second-hand prices instead of the prices that will be set
by the second-hand market in the next period. This is in general not very important and may
be considered to be consistent with consumer myopia. Nevertheless in the particular case of
technology changes, this assumption would be equivalent to base expectations on pre-
existing technologies rather than on new technologies. It has therefore been assumed that
the relative price increase for second-hand cars, following the adoption of new technology,
would equal the relative increase new cars incur for the same reason. In other words, the
resell value at the end of the period incorporates the (depreciated) value of the technological
add-ons. The modified equation is:
&$3& = L * 3.8 1&3&+ (0.4 1&3& – 2&03m1NWL)
where NWL is the ratio of new car prices with and without the new technology:19
NWL = (1&33W/ 1&33W–￿).
&DUPDUNHWV
Producer QHZ car prices (1&33are set in the production block following a minimisation by
car manufacturers of the lifetime costs assumed by consumers for a given vehicle category.
Consumer prices (1&3&) differ from producer prices as VAT and purchase taxes (2&3are
generally due upon registration of vehicles by consumers. The purchase tax is modelled as
an ad-valorem tax (i.e. proportional to the value of the car), a system that is found in some
Member States (e.g. NL) and one that seems a reasonable approximation of the different tax
equations applied by Member States with purchase taxes. An implicit consequence of this is
that the purchase tax also taxes technological add-ons and increase car prices.
1&3& 1&339$7&$52&3
                                                
18 Note that no adjustment is made for (expected) capital gains/losses of applying a linear depreciation scheme in
the case of old cars.  This can be justified by the lower book values of old vintages, implying that the share of
capacity costs in total ownership costs are of less importance than for new cars.
19  This ratio is measured by comparing prices in two subsequent periods. As autonomous technical progress is
included in the model, one should always applied this modified equation (including for the baseline runs) or
alternatively, correct for it. 
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Car prices on second hand markets equate the demand and available stock of "old" vehicles.
Second-hand car markets are therefore cleared, with endogenous scrappage and second-
hand prices as the crucial variables.
 )OHHWWXUQRYHU
The age structure of the fleet is an important characteristic, as the emission profiles differ
very significantly across vintages. The relative (cost-)effectiveness of various policy
instruments to limit emissions is therefore strongly dependent on this characteristic. This
aspect is for instance especially relevant each time the relative prices of old and new cars
change. The age structure depends on:
- the stock of old cars transferred from period to period (which depends on the
scrappage of existing old cars),
- the number of new cars added to the fleet in each period.
The available number of old cars ((9&76*R) is reduced over time following scrappage
during successive periods. Beginning with the number of cars (at the moment of purchase)
of each vintage (9,17, by size and generation), and keeping track of successive scrappage in
previous periods (&6&5$3), the available number of old cars by size and vintage in each
period can be calculated:
(6&5$3 6WRFN
(6&5$3 &6&5$3 9,17 9&76*&
R
R R
- =
- - =
(6&5$3 is the scrappage occurring during the periodIt is partly dependent on market
conditions and partly fixed exogenously.
The parameters of cumulated scrappage (&6&5$3) and of the initial size of the vintage
(9,17) are indexed to period and vintage (R = PPPP, i.e. cars aged 1, 2, 3, 4 or
more periods). These parameters are transferred and updated between periods, making the
model dynamic (refer to box1 for a visualisation of the process):
1(: W 0 W 9&76*$ 9,17 , 1 , 1 = +     with  1(: W 9&76*$ , , the number of new cars,
1 , 2 , 1 0 W 0 W 9,17 9,17 = +
2 , 3 , 1 0 W 0 W 9,17 9,17 = +
For the oldest vintage (cars aged 20 or more), this equation is modified:
4 , 3 , 4 , 1 0 W 0 W 0 W 9,17 9,17 9,17 + = +
 as some cars of the oldest vintage remain (are not scrapped).
The same pattern is followed for the transcription of cumulated scrappage in previous
periods (&6&5$3The cumulated scrappage &6&5$3t+1,M in one period is equal to the
sum of cumulated scrappage &6&5$3W at the beginning of the pervious period and the
number of scrapped cars in the previous period. 
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) (
0
0
4 , 4 , 3 , 3 , 4 , 1
2 , 2 , 3 , 1
1 , 2 , 1
1 , 1
0 W 0 W 0 W 0 W 0 W
0 W 0 W 0 W
0 W 0 W
0 W
(6&5$3 &6&5$3 (6&5$3 &6&5$3 &6&5$3
(6&5$3 &6&5$3 &6&5$3
(6&5$3 &6&5$3
&6&5$3
+ + + =
+ =
+ =
=
+
+
+
+
The cumulated scrappage, hence, refers to the cumulated scrappage at the EHJLQQLQJ of the
simulation period. In the model, it is assumed that no scrappage has yet taken place for
vehicles that were introduced into the vehicle fleet in the previous period (i.e. no scrappage
for ’new’ cars).  Available statistical evidence suggests that this is a reasonable
approximation as only a small fraction of new cars are scrapped in the first five years.
(QGRJHQRXVVFUDSSDJH
The idea behind endogenous scrappage in EUCARS is that the scrappage decision is based
on a comparison of likely repair expenditures and current vehicle market prices (vintage
dependent). The expected repair expenditures are assumed to follow a normal distribution.
Furthermore, homogeneity is assumed, i.e. subsequent to repair a vehicle becomes
indistinguishable again from other vehicles of its size-vintage class (i.e. all vehicles
belonging to a size-vintage class are homogenous). Non-repaired vehicles cannot be used
and have a market value of zero. A fixed proportion of exogenous scrappage represents cars
that can no longer be repaired ("total losses").
As consumers are assumed to optimise utility, they will repair the vehicle if the expected
repair expenditures are below the second hand market price of the size-vintage class. Given
the homogeneity assumption, it is always better to repair a vehicle if the associated costs are
less than the second hand market price. Vehicles with repair costs above the second hand
market price are scrapped20.
The number of vehicles per size-vintage class that are scrapped in a certain period
((6&5$3), is thus expressed as follows:
[] {} (6&5$3 (;6&5$3 6WRFN
2&03 5&
5& =- +
- 1 &8013)  
m
s
where   5&     is the mean of the required repair costs following breakdown
                          (size and vintage dependent),
            5&s     is the standard deviation of the repair costs (5&m 5&s ),
            2&03  is the second hand market price,
        (;6&5$3  is the proportion of the stock scrapped in any event
                             (exogenous scrappage forms about one third of total scrappage), and
            6WRFN   is the vehicle stock by size and vintage at the beginning of the period,
and in which &8013)x is the integral of the standard normal distribution from -¥ to x.
                                                
20  If governments were to introduce policies to stimulate scrappage, this would affect the choice a consumer has to
make. In the set-up chosen in this model a modest scrappage subsidy would have similar effects to an increase in
repair costs, but would, in addition, also have budgetary implications. Hence, "modest" scrappage schemes can
be evaluated in EUCARS by increasing the repair costs, and, in addition, increasing the available income by the
amount of subsidies given. 
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9&76*& 9,17 &6&5$3 (6&5$3
6WRFN (6&5$3
2/’ ’’ =- -
=-
The "supply" of old cars in a specific period
is now completely specified, with its dependence on stock previously accumulated, and on
second-hand market conditions. Demand is a function of relative prices on these and other
related markets.
 3URGXFWLRQEORFNVVSHFLILFIXHOFRQVXPSWLRQHPLVVLRQVDQGIXHOTXDOLW\
The specific fuel consumption and conventional emission profiles of new vehicles depend
on technology choices made by car manufacturers, which are modelled explicitly in
EUCARS.  The approach chosen assumes a perfectly competitive car market with consumer
short-sightedness: i.e. manufacturers will produce vehicles with characteristics such as to
arrive at the lowest life cycle cost possible for consumers given their assumed high discount
rate (50%), subject, of course, to prevailing regulations (e.g. emission standards).  The same
applies to fuel manufacturers who decide on the types of petrol and diesel fuel on offer.
Subject to rules on fuel quality, a least-cost combination of diesel and petrol fuel qualities is
chosen.  Whereas vehicle technologies are fixed once produced, fuel quality can be changed
every five-year period.  Car manufacturers minimise discounted costs of the average
lifetime of a vehicle (11 years in EUCARS), whereas fuel manufacturers can change
specifications after five years. Short-sightedness is therefore not an issue for fuel quality.
Decisions on specific fuel consumption, conventional emission profiles and fuel quality are
independent in EUCARS.  This reflects the fact that, according to available evidence,
changes in specific fuel consumption are unrelated to specific conventional emissions per
kilometre and vice versa.  Changes in fuel quality have proportional effects on emissions,
independent of vehicle technologies chosen, e.g. a 2% reduction in NOx emissions across
gasoline vehicles, independent of their pollution abatement equipment. Whereas this
assumption does not hold under all circumstances, it seems a reasonable approximation,
which is also followed in other transport emission models.  Moreover, to the extent that
interaction effects are important, they can be imposed on the model. This might be
particularly relevant in cases where anti-pollution equipment on vehicles requires certain
fuel specifications (e.g. low sulphur fuel for De-NOx catalytic converters on diesel cars).
The production block of the model, in its current state, consists of three distinct modules
describing specific fuel consumption (3.4.1), conventional emissions (3.4.2) and fuel quality
(3.4.3).
 6SHFLILFIXHOFRQVXPSWLRQ
Different measures of fuel efficiency are used in EUCARS for the production block and the
main module (the transport module). We describe here the determination of the “technical
fuel consumption” used in the production block. The “technical fuel consumption” referred
to is the labelled fuel consumption (EuroMix21 values are used to calibrate the production
block). The “on-road fuel consumption”, and the link with technical fuel consumption are
presented in Section 3.7.
                                                
21  Labelling standard for fuel consumption. 
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The fuel consumption module of the production block determines the characteristics (fuel
economy and price) of newly produced cars. Two possible effects are considered: technical
progress, and changes in price affecting consumers’ preferences (mainly fuel price changes,
but also the effects of (other) fiscal instruments such as the introduction of a specific
purchase tax based on fuel economy, also called the gas-guzzler tax (*JWD[)). Technical
progress is supposed to reduce the costs of achieving a given fuel consumption over time. A
time factor (7I) is introduced in the equations to describe this effect. Technical cost curves
are used to relate improvements in fuel efficiency and car price increases due to these
improvements.
The technical cost curves are based on OECD information (Michaelis, 1996), and on the
situation in the current car market.22 An exponential function was chosen to describe the
technical relationships:
1&33 = W * 7I * H[S( a / ()&-l) )
Where  1&33 is the pre-tax price of the new car,
)& is the technical fuel consumption of this new car,
7I is the technical progress parameter (time factor) whose value is 0.97 in the first
5-year period, and decreases by 0.03 for each subsequent new period,
a,  W and l are technical parameters. The l value can be interpreted as the
maximum technically feasible (the minimum reachable fuel consumption).
For the fuel price effects, consumers are assumed to be short-sighted, i.e. to over-discount
expected mileage and fuel efficiency gains. They equalise marginal cost and marginal
benefit based on their expected mileage (.P), along a technical cost curve. Their assumed
discount rate is 50%, which corresponds to an undiscounted payback period of three years23.
For small cars, the (expected future discounted) mileage taken into account is 33 300 km,
while it would be 86 600 km if a more rational discount rate of 7% was used. The expected
mileage is to be multiplied by current fuel prices including taxes (3IXHOW). 24
                                                
22 Minimum and maximum curves are given; they relate percentage increases in car prices and percentage
reductions in fuel consumption. These were applied to the current situation on the different markets (small,
medium, large, diesel, LPG cars) to obtain five different sets of curves, in absolute terms. As relative changes
are converted into absolute changes the reference situation plays an important role. See the technical document
for further detail.
23  Based on oral communication from car industry representative.
24  The assumption used here is that myopic consumers take only 38% of the total fuel costs (including tax) into
account, and therefore choose sub-optimal specific fuel consumption. However, as the taxes amount to 66% of
the fuel price, the selected fuel consumption might be close to an optimum calculated on the basis of resource
prices (exclusive of tax). 
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The selected fuel consumption for a particular car type is therefore given by:
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since the relevant price for consumers includes taxes: 1&3& 1&332&39$7&$5.
The  (UURU 5HIHUHQFH VRXUFH QRW IRXQG below shows the cost curve for small cars,
compared to the OECD reference data, and to the Greenpeace Twingo SmILE25.  The cost
curve indicates that small improvements in fuel efficiency (of up to 15%) can be achieved at
very low production costs.  This is, of course, fully consistent with the assumed high
discount rates used by consumers in evaluating future fuel savings: indeed without this
assumption the existence of such low marginal cost would be hard to explain.
)LJXUH  &RVW FXUYH IXHO HFRQRP\ IRU VPDOO JDVROLQH FDUV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25  Greenpeace literature simply states that the "(Twingo SmILE) will not be significantly more expensive than the
respective original model. The final price naturally depends in the final analysis upon mass production". The
costs figure (12% increase compared to the original cost of the model) used here was taken from the press (for
instance TIME International Magazine, October 14, 1996,  (16)). The achieved fuel economy ranges from
3.26 l/100km (stated fuel consumption) to 3.8 l/100 km (Swiss road test). 
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 6SHFLILFHPLVVLRQVRIFRQYHQWLRQDOSROOXWDQWV
For each type of car, costs to consumers related to conventional emissions (CO, VOC, NOx,
and PM10) are minimised over the whole life of the vehicle. These costs comprise, on the
one hand, emissions control costs (i.e. production costs – passed on by manufacturers to
consumers – and higher maintenance costs) and, on the other hand, possible emission costs
linked to "taxes on emissions" which can be introduced in EUCARS. For example, an
annual road tax based on average emission factors and/or on mileage driven can be
introduced. The average emission factors depend on the control technology chosen when
manufacturing the vehicle, and on the maintenance of the car26. Here also the consumer is
expected to be short-sighted, i.e. expenses over the whole life are discounted with the same
very high discount rate (50%).
This leads to the following discrete optimisation problem:
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With:  V: type of car
   VPDOO (gasoline), PHGLXP (gasoline), ODUJH (gasoline), GLHVHO
M: instrument
   FDU (technology), ,0(inspection and maintenance), HYDSR(control of evaporation
emissions)
L: intensity of instrument M
    (no measure),  Q  The number of intensities per instrument depends on the
instrument.
SRO: primary pollutant
        12[, &2, 92&,30 (particulate matter)
LMV [ : 0/1 variable. [LMV =1 if the Lth intensity of the instrument M is chosen for new type
V cars. Number of available instruments and intensities vary with car type: evaporative
                                                
26  The choice of a maintenance scheme is partially determined at purchase, because some inspection and
maintenance cases require installation of "On Board Diagnostics". 
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emissions are a problem for gasoline cars only, inspection and maintenance schemes vary
for diesel and gasoline cars, etc.
FLMV: additional cost for a type  V car if the instrument  M is chosen with the
intensity  L  FL LMV =" = 00             [ECU/car]
FRVWLMV ,,: additional cost to the car manufacturer (including increase in margin to be
paid by consumer) for a type V car if the instrument M is chosen at the intensity L[ECU/car]
V V 9$7&DU 2&3 , : purchase tax and VAT          [%]
OLIHFRVWLM , : average annual cost of the chosen instrument to the consumer (nonzero
only for IM schemes)              [ECU/car/year]
,QW :  interest rate   (50%)
9,( :  expected lifetime of a new car           (11) years
WD[SRO:  tax on emissions           ECU/g pol
HPLVVV SRO , : expected emissions of a type V vehicle during its whole life (discounted)
      [g pol/car]
SRO V HYDSRHPLVV , :average evaporative emissions per car.  0 , = SRO V HYDSRHPLVV
92& SRO ¹ "      [g/car/year]
NP\HDU V , :  expected mileage per year   [km/car/year]
DYJH[KDXVWV SRO ￿ :average exhaust emission factor of a new car type V(if no control
technology is chosen)       [g pol/km]
IDFWRU\HDU L M V SRO ,, ,, :  emission reduction factor, depending on the instruments chosen.
This factor applies to emissions of pollutant SRO.
Relevant data is presented in Denis (1998) and follows the conclusions of the study
undertaken for the Auto-Oil Programme (Touche Ross, 1995), which can be updated should
new information become available.The cost-minimisation problem is solved depending on
the exact emission tax setting (see Chapter 5 for examples of use).  Clearly, emission
standards and other regulatory policies can be simulated by selecting specific control
technologies.
 )XHO4XDOLW\
In EUCARS, the choice of fuel quality is also based on cost-minimisation. Two elements
determine this process: the costs of producing ’cleaner’ fuels, and the possible costs to
consumers (in function of fuel taxation) of more polluting fuels. A change in fuel
composition would affect emissions instantaneously, but it can be reverted without major
difficulties in the next period. For these reasons, optimisation is carried out on a period by
period basis (implying that there is no need for discounting over the entire lifetime of the
vehicle fleet).
Because there are technical links between production of petrol and diesel fuels (not all
combinations are possible in a refinery, precise allocation of costs is difficult) and because a
change of fuel would affect emissions of all cars, the optimisation must be done for the
refinery sector as a whole. The fuel quality model gives the fuel quality of diesel and petrol, 
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plus the associated consumer prices, which influence consumer behaviour in the rest of the
model.
åå å å +
L V J SRO
SRO SRO J V J V L L WD[ HPLVVLRQV Q F [ , , , min
s.t.    [L
L
= å 1
å - =
L
SRO V L L SRO J V J V SRO J V 5(' [ DYJHPLV NP HPLVVLRQV ) 1 ( , , , , , , ,
Sets:
V: type of car
   VPDOO (gasoline), PHGLXP (gasoline), ODUJH (gasoline), GLHVHO
J: vintage of car
   QHZ (aged 0-5), P(aged 5-10), P(aged 10-15), P(aged 15-20), P(aged 20 and
over)
L: fuel package (= definition of gasoline and diesel fuels)
    (no change),   Numbering of the options follows Touche Ross, 1995.
SRO: primary pollutant
        12[, &2, 92&,30 (particulate matter)
Decision variable:
[L:0 1variables. [L =1 if the Lth fuel package is chosen for the entire fleet. Only one fuel
package (combination of diesel and petrol) is chosen as the result of the optimisation:.
Control costs:
L F : Total cost of the L
th package, inclusive of VAT [ECU]
Technical costs of the packages are estimated at the refineries level: they therefore represent
costs of fuel(s) reformulating for the whole of the EU.
Emission costs:
QVJ : number of cars of type V and vintage J for the period    [cars]
WD[SRO  : tax on emissions    [ECU/g pol]
HPLVVLRQVV J SRO ￿￿ average car emissions over a period    [g pol/car]
Q HPLVVLRQV V J V J SRO
J V
￿￿ ￿ å å  is a technical formula that is equivalent to ’fleet average emission
factors’ multiplied by the ’number of cars’.
Q HPLVVLRQV WD[ VJ VJS R O
SRO J V
SRO ,, , å å å  therefore represents the costs for the entire fleet of the
chosen option due to the presence of an emission tax.   [ECU] 
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Emission costs are calculated for the entire fleet, based on a theoretical tax rate depending
on average emission factors. In practice however (and in EUCARS main module) two
different excise rates are applied on fuels (one excise rate for petrol and one for diesel).
 &RQJHVWLRQDQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDYHUDJHVSHHGV
The congestion module depicts the interrelation of traffic volume and available
infrastructure to determine average speed. The assumption is that every additional km has
an impact on other users of the same network by reducing speed. This is modelled through
aggregate speed-flow curves, one per network (rural, urban peak, urban off-peak,
highway)27 with the assumption that the driving style is homogenous on the network. An
illustration of the curves used in EUCARS 3 is given below.
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The aggregate travel time curves are exponential in capacity utilisation, which, according to
available studies (Kirwan HWDO, 1994), is a reasonable approximation of the relation between
travel speeds and traffic flows in transport networks. The link between average travel time
(7LPH = 1/6SHHG) and total number of kilometres (NP) driven is formulated in the following
way:
                                                
27  For reasons of simplicity, two different networks are used for urban peak and urban off-peak. 
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a + * = ) exp(WUDIILF = 7LPH 7LPH WUDIILF QHWZRUN QHWZRUN =+ ZH[S  a
where  = and  a are parameters specific to the individual networks and where WUDIILF
represents the capacity utilisation of the infrastructure:
WUDIILF NP ,1)5$
WULSW\SH JHQHUDWLRQ VL]H
= å å å    b WUDIILF NP ,1)5$
WULSW\SH JHQHUDWLRQ VL]H
= å å å   b
The level of infrastructure by location (,1)5$) is determined exogenously. = DQG  a b is
used, for the urban infrastructure, to indicate the ratio between peak and offpeak hours. The
default value is one. It is three for the urban peak network to approximate the ratio between
the two periods (on average 5 to 6 hours in the peak period, for 15 to 20 hours off-peak).
The average travel times per car category are then determined by modifying the average
travel time on a specific network to account for the differences in engine size.
7LPHVVL]H IDFWRUVL]H7LPH
Speeds (and travel times) are generally affected by the infrastructure utilisation level, but
could also be modified by rigorously enforced speed limits (for example see European
Commission, 1995a).
The travel time of public transport is partly a function of road congestion as buses and trams
are (partly) affected by road congestion. Clearly, public transport by metro or train is
independent of road traffic volumes. The average travel time per km of public transport can
thus be written as:
7LPH N 7LPH SXEO F WUDQVSRUW O QHWZRUN O
ORFDW RQ
=+ - å ll d v  ￿ 1
in which:
 l represents the share of mileage by means of public transport that is "insensitive" to
road congestion,
N is the average fixed travel time for public transport insensitive to "road" congestion,
d represents the ratio between travel time by "road congestion sensitive" public
transport and by cars (assumed fixed) and
v is the share of public transport on rural, urban (peak and offpeak) and highway areas.
The inclusion of congestion implies that reducing mileage has a positive effect on welfare,
especially when urban peak mileage is reduced.
 &RQYHQWLRQDOHPLVVLRQV
EUCARS contains a block comprising equations that describe total emissions of NOx, CO,
HC, PM and NO2, by size, class and vintage (in addition, emissions from public transport
are modelled). These equations are for the most part taken from the Copert II methodology
adopted in the CORINAIR working group (Eggleston H.S. HWDO, 1991). They are generally
technology specific. The same methodology is the basis for the FOREMOVE emission
computer (Zachariadis, 1992).
%DVLFPHWKRGRORJ\
Emissions are made of various components. Exhaust and evaporative emissions are first
computed separately. Extra emissions due to cold start are then added to basic emissions 
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(occurring with hot engines), while degradation factors depending on maintenance and
mileage driven modify the basic emission factors.
Emission factors for the different pollutants are technology specific and speed dependent.
They vary with road classes and average speeds (urban peak/off-peak, rural, highway). Extra
cold start emissions are taken into account by modifying the hot emissions for urban driving
(i.e. all cold start emissions are allocated to urban driving). An outline of the basis
methodology is given in Box 2.
%2;%DVLF&RSHUWPHWKRGRORJ\IRUFDOFXODWLQJWKHHPLVVLRQVIURPURDGWUDQVSRUW
¨ Exhaust emissions from hot engines by size, class and vintage [in grams]
å =
H GULYLQJPRG
H GULYLQJPRG H GULYLQJPRG VKDUH DJH DQQXDOPLOH YHKLFOHV VSHHG FWRU HPLVVLRQID * * * ) (
= åemissionfactor *vehicles *annualmileage km/ vehicle *share roadclass
roadclass
roadclass gk m 
¨ Cold start correction factor
  KRW
FROG
H
H
JH WRWDOPLOHD * * + = b 1 =+* * 1 b total mileage
e
e
cold
hot  
with  b = fraction  of mileage driven
with cold engines
¨ Total exhaust emissions by size and vintage (in grams)
IDFWRU FRUUHFWLRQ VWDUW FROG HQJLQHV KRW IURP HPLVVLRQV H[KDXVW * =
= * H[KDXVW HPLVVLRQV IURP KRW HQJLQHV FROG VWDUW FRUUHFWLRQ IDFWRU in grammes / by size, class and vintage
¨ Evaporative emissions from gasoline cars include diurnal and hot soak emissions in
addition to running losses. These emissions depend on climatic conditions, fuel and car
characteristics and driving pattern.
Evaporative emissions [in grams]
=+ 365  vehicles emissionfactor k mileage
¨Total emissions = exhaust emissions + evaporative emissions
Emission factors for catalyst cars deteriorate following a linear trend.  The slope of the
degradation depends on the type of inspection and maintenance scheme adopted.  Emission
factors for conventional cars assume a certain degree of inspection and maintenance and
correspond to a lifelong average.  Further inspection would reduce these emission factors.
Two main determinants influence total emissions. First, technical emission factors, which
can be improved through new technologies, inspection and maintenance, modifications of
the fleet structure (scrappage scheme, fiscal incentives) and possibly through speed 
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modifications. The second determinant is  ’traffic volume’ (i.e. mileage or number of cars),
broken down to be coherent with technical emission factors. This determinant will vary with
price changes (of fuel, new cars, taxes etc.), traffic regulations, and congestion levels. The
reader interested in the calculation details and the functions relating emission factors and
speed is referred to the Copert methodology, or Denis (1998) for its application to
EUCARS.
(PLVVLRQVDQGWKHSURGXFWLRQEORFN
The conventional emission characteristics of new vehicles sold during the 1990-2010
simulation period follow from the minimisation of lifetime vehicle costs by car
manufacturers. This is carried out in the production block of EUCARS. Obviously,
emissions standards imply that manufacturers can only choose from vehicle technologies
with emissions per kilometre below the standard.
Introduction of new techniques is modelled through percentage reductions in the current
emission factors. Once the emission reduction percentage is determined in the production
block, it is applied to the emissions output calculated as a function of speed by the model.
(PLVVLRQVDQGWKHWHFKQLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIIXHOV
Emission formulae presented above are given for reference petrol and diesel fuels.  For the
23 packages of reformulated fuels investigated in the AD Little study, reduction factors for
the emission of the main pollutants are used (see 3.4.3).
 2QURDGIXHOXVHDQG&2￿(PLVVLRQV
 )XHOHIILFLHQF\LQWKHWUDQVSRUWPRGXOHLQXVHIXHOFRQVXPSWLRQ
The technical fuel economy of new cars is fixed in the production block. However, like
emissions, the real fuel consumption of a car is affected by many other factors, including the
average network speed (highway or congested city).
Calculation of on-road fuel consumption follows the same calculation method described
above for emissions, based on the Copert formulae. The model contains formulae linking
fuel consumption to speed that are different for different types of car (vintage, size and fuel
types). Average speeds are endogenous in EUCARS, and therefore, the fuel consumption
for the same trip with the same car can change for different policy scenarios28. Extra
consumption for cold starts is added and allocated exclusively to urban driving (this is also
the rule in the Copert reference manual).
According to this methodology, average consumption of the whole fleet in the 1991-1995 is
roughly equal to 8.25 l/100 km, while average consumption of new cars in the same period
                                                
28  Average speed and allocation to different location are taken here as a proxy for driving styles, as is the case in
FOREMOVE. 
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is equal to 8.19 l/100 km29 (this is to be compared with average fuel consumption in the
production block of 7.77 l/100 km).
 /LQNEHWZHHQWHFKQLFDOIXHOHFRQRP\SURGXFWLRQEORFNDQGRQURDGIXHO
HFRQRP\
Improvements in technical fuel efficiency are based on technical improvement over time, as
well as the possible effect of tax incentives. They are incorporated in the production module
(see above §3.4.1.), and transmitted proportionally to the TRANPORT module. For
example, if, due to calculations in the production block, fuel consumption appears to be
reduced by 10% in period t when compared to period t-1, then the speed formula for the
new cars is multiplied by 0.9 in the TRANPORT module:
5$7,2I
)&
)&
W
W
W
=
-1
  and   25)& 5$7,2I I 6SHHG WW =* 
with 25)&, the on-road fuel consumption.
We therefore ensure that both the speed and technology effects can modify the on-road fuel
consumption.
 &2￿HPLVVLRQV
Fuel consumption figures are the basis for calculating CO2 emissions. Given the fixed
relationship between fuel types and CO2 emissions, the calculation of car emissions can be
carried out directly based on total fuel use and specific emission coefficients ((0). CO2
emissions per unit of public transport use are fixed (&273) and consequently possible
improvements in fuel economy, possible fuel switches, and possible alternative uses of
available capacity are ignored.
åå ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
* +
* =
W\SH JHQHUDWLRQ
H GULYLQJPRG JHQHUDWLRQ W\SH H GULYLQJPRG JHQHUDWLRQ W\SH W\SH 9&76*$5 )()) (0
73 &2 9&73 &2
, , , ,
2 2
where  9&73 is the volume of public transport (endogenous),
)()) is the “on-road fuel efficiency” (endogenous),
and  9&76*$5 is the mileage by car size, vintage and driving mode
(endogenous).&2 9&73 &2 73 (0 )()) 9&76*$ VL]H VL]H JHQ VL]H JHQ XVDJH JHQ VL]H 22 =+ å å * ,, , ’ ’
CO2 is a global pollutant, and therefore emissions are not attributed to location.
                                                
29  Introduction of catalytic converters during the period explains why there is so little difference between the
consumption of old and new cars. 
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 $SSUDLVDOSDUDPHWHUV
For the purpose of scenario evaluation, aggregate emissions from transport (CO2 and
conventional) are computed in the emission modules (3.6 and 3.7.3), and compared with the
total costs of introducing policy measures (i.e. welfare costs).
Total costs include congestion as the model uses the concept of full income and prices
including a time component (§3.1). Contrary to congestion, air emissions do not directly
affect economic welfare, as EUCARS does not contain any information on damage costs
from emissions. They are however calculated to enable scenario evaluation. Other external
costs (noise, accidents) are not reported, and are not included in the model.
:HOIDUHSULYDWHZHOIDUHDQGJRYHUQPHQWUHYHQXHV
Consumer welfare is determined at the highest level of the consumption block where a
choice is made between transport services and other goods and services.  This is modelled
by a simple CES demand system which, due to the fact that it is linear homogeneous, allows
welfare changes induced by policy measures to be directly translated into equivalent
variations:
(9 = - {(8new- 8old)/8old} * <
in which 8QHZ and 8ROG denote utility levels in the policy simulation case and the baseline
respectively. < stands for total expenditures on consumption.
If we add to this expression the change in government revenues, the total welfare cost
(negative welfare change), denoted :(/)&267 can be computed30. The revenues change
can be negative: diminution of the tax basis, subsidy, or positive: new taxes or increase in
existing taxes. It is standard practice to weight the welfare contribution of tax revenue as
equal to one (see section 2.5). Other assumptions (revenues used to reduce highly distorting
taxes, …) modify the marginal cost of public funds (0&3)):
:(/)&2679 ^8QHZ8ROG8ROG`<0&3)5(9QHZ5(9ROG
5(9, total net government revenues, is the sum of revenue from all taxes in the road
transport sector: the purchase tax and VAT on new cars (2&3, 9$7&DU), the fuel taxes
(9&3, 9$7)), the annual road tax on ownership ()&3) and the eventual gas-guzzler or
emission-based tax levied on new cars depending on their characteristics (*JWD[ and WD[).
Revenues of a possible road-pricing scheme are also added, and possible subsidies
(scrappage incentives, further subsidy to public transport31) are subtracted.
The welfare metric calculated in EUCARS does not contain the welfare effects of
environmental damage. This implies that the current version of the model can only be used
                                                
30  No changes in producers’ surplus given the assumptions taken.
31  For reasons of simplicity changes in public transport levels do not affect government welfare in the current
version of EUCARS (i.e. subsidies remain constant). Changes in the subsidy level (cheaper fares) are the only
changes acknowledged. 
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for a cost-effectiveness analysis, where, for fixed environmental or other objectives, policy
instruments can be evaluated by inspecting the associated welfare costs. Clearly, if more
information on damage costs is available, then the welfare concept could be expanded to
comprise a broader welfare definition, including environmental costs. This would
technically be relatively simple, but would require good estimates of damage cost relations.
Such a formulation would allow the model to be used for carrying out cost-benefit analysis
of policies.
 0$,1(/$67,&,7,(6$1''$7$6285&(6
This chapter briefly describes the key parameters and main data sources that have been used
to quantify EUCARS.  A more detailed listing of data information is available in the
technical note.
 (ODVWLFLWLHV
It is useful to make a distinction between explicit and implicit elasticities. The former refers
to parameters of the model and, hence, to elasticities that can actually be found in the
programme codes (i.e. the structural coefficients). Generally, these elasticities occur in
equations describing interactions between a limited number of variables. Implicit elasticities
refer to the sensitivity of a variable to some exogenous shock, taking account of DOO the
interactions that occur in the model. These elasticities can, hence, only be deduced from a
particular simulation. The elasticities found in the literature (see, for example, Goodwin
(1992) and Oum et al. (1992)) are often based on reduced form equations, in which case
they have to be interpreted as "implicit" elasticities.
The explicit elasticities in EUCARS are found at relatively disaggregated levels in the
model. For example, at all levels of the consumption block, individual substitution
elasticities are needed. They condition the price and income elasticities at this specific level.
For instance, while the price elasticity of fuel consumption has been the subject of research
and publication, the different mechanisms involved (fleet reduction, fleet downsizing,
technical improvements in fuel economy, changes in annual mileage) can only be influenced
in EUCARS through very specific, technical parameters. For other domains, relatively little
information is available, or information on elasticities at a low level of aggregation is often
not in a format that allows direct transposition to the neo-classical demand structures used
in EUCARS.
This implies that the parameterisation (i.e. setting of the explicit elasticities) has been
guided by a number of the entire model’s resulting key implicit elasticities, as these could
be verified by referring to the literature. This process, together with data input for the
reference situation, was carried out during the calibration phase. Obviously, as in any model
of this nature, there are only a limited number of degrees of freedom in selecting implicit
and explicit price elasticities, resulting from the functional forms chosen.
Two very important "benchmark" explicit elasticities, subject to extensive research, have
been used during calibration together with other information. They are the price elasticity of
total mileage with respect to fuel prices, and the price elasticity of total fuel consumption
with respect to fuel prices. The model has been calibrated so as to obtain a long run value of
-0.2 for the price elasticity of total mileage with respect to fuel prices and a value close to 
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-0.5 for the price elasticity of total fuel consumption. The benchmark taken is Goodwin
(1992), which is considered the most extensive survey on this issue:
“for a sustained real 10 percent increase in fuel price, the response in the longer run
consists of a reduction in traffic of 3 to 5 percent (with reduction in car ownership
accounting for the half of it), while the total fuel consumption diminishes by about 7
percent through downsizing, better fuel economy and behavioural changes
(adaptation of the driving mode)”.
As this later behavioural response is missing in EUCARS, the benchmark taken is a total
reduction in fuel consumption of –4.5 percent for a 10 percent increase in fuel prices. Half
of the response should then come from reduced mileage (of which half from reduced fleet
size and half from reduction in average annual driving) and half from fuel economy
(adaptation in fleet composition and technical changes). The main explicit elasticities and
structural coefficients determining the fuel consumption response in the model are:
- the substitution elasticity at the first level (transport vs. other goods and services),
- the SHAREMIN parameter (i.e. part of the compulsory mileage “bought with” the
ownership of a car). The smaller its value, the more the mileage component responds to
the fuel price signal. On the other hand, very small values would damage necessary the
complementarity between ownership and usage.
- the coefficients and functional form of the efficiency module of the production
block, conditioning the technical response. The cost curves used and the short-sighted
component fit reasonably well with the results published by Goodwin.
Admittedly, the chosen elasticities are a bit on the low side. However they result from a
detailed model describing different behavioural patterns, and are not simple parameter(s)
plugged into a reduced form equation. Moreover the structure of the response to a shock in
fuel is in keeping with the literature. Finally, previous work on CO2 emission limitation has
been published (Koopman, 1995) using a set of generally accepted elasticities close to the
present set.
Regarding the choice between public and private transport, there is also a significant amount
of empirical work available. Most studies conclude that, at the aggregate level, the cross-
price elasticity of car use with respect to public transport prices and travel times is relatively
small. Conversely, demand for public transport is strongly sensitive to car prices and travel
times (for an extensive discussion, see Gwilliam HW DO. (1991)). Clearly, this is largely
determined by the fact that the public transport share in total mobility is quite small (approx.
16% of mileage and 8% of total transport expenses). In EUCARS, the substitution elasticity
between private and public transport is set at three, implying cross-price elasticities with
respect to generalised costs of 1.6 for public transport and 0.4 for car45
7DEOH/RQJUXQDIWHU\HDUVLPSOLFLWHODVWLFLWLHVRI(8&$5632
on:
Effects of:
car usage car ownership use of public
transport
average travel time in
urban congested /
non congested areas
Total tax
revenues from
car ownership
and use
technical fuel
consumption (litre/km)
(medium gasoline
cars)
1% increase in fuel prices - 0.20 % - 0.09 % + 0.20 % - 0.19 % / - 0.07 % + 0.52 %33 - 0.27 %
1% increase in new car
prices
- 0.17 % - 0.35 % + 0.26 % - 0.17 % / - 0.06 % - 0.02 %34 -
1% reduction in public
transport prices
- 0.07 % -0.06 % + 0.95 % - 0.07 % / - 0.02 % - 0.07 % -
1% reduction in travel
time by public transport
- 0.14 % - 0.13 % + 1.96 % - 0.14 % / - 0.05 % - 0.14 % -
1% reduction in travel
time by car
+ 0.81 % + 0.42 % - 2.61 % - 0.15% / -0.70 %35 + 0.63 % -
1% increase in
infrastructure capacity
(roads)
+ 0.33 % + 0.13 % + 0.11 % - 0.65 % / - 0.24 % + 0.23 % -
                                                
32 Version of 01/10/97
33 The fuel price increase is realised through an increase in taxation
34 New car prices (net of taxes) are 1% above baseline. Car purchase taxes are proportional to the car price; the increase in consumer prices, and in car taxes is therefore also
equal to 1%.
35 Secondary effects nearly outweigh the initial shock in urban area rush hours47
usage36. Obviously, the elasticities with respect to individual components of the generalised
costs (i.e. petrol prices) are much smaller. These values are close to averages reported for
aggregate cases in the above-mentioned survey by Goodwin (1992) and accord well with
some of the evidence presented in Koopman (1992).
The magnitude of price sensitivity between old and new cars, as well as between different
car categories, is more uncertain. Various studies report differing findings which seem to
depend strongly on the definition of car categories. However, especially where substitution
between various car types is concerned, it seems that cross-price elasticities are relatively
large in a number of cases (see e.g. Bordley (1993) and De Pelsmacker (1990)). Given the
functional specification used at levels three and four (CES) in EUCARS, the price
sensitivity can only be affected by means of the elasticity of substitution of the CES
function which subsequently determines all the cross price elasticities. A value of 1.25 has
been used, implying cross-price elasticities up to 0.15 for (the various categories of) old and
new cars, whilst the elasticity of substitution is fixed at 1.5 for substitution between
individual car types.
At the fifth level, for the choice between committed (COM) services and supplementary
(SUPPL) mileage, the parameters of the LES function determine the cross effect of price
changes. Changes in SUPPL price have little effect on the volume of COM services. This
was chosen in view of the fact that SUPPL price elements are already contained in COM.
Conversely, there is a small negative effect on the volume of SUPPL services from a price
increase in COM services. The resulting implicit cross-price elasticities of car ownership
and usage (see Table 4) square reasonably well with results reported by De Jong (1989,
1991) for the Netherlands.
While the cross price elasticities are positive for the first four levels in the model tree
(substitutable services), they are negative for the bottom levels (seven to nine) with very low
substitution possibilities ( 5 . 0 £ s ). These latter levels are characterised by gross
complementarity in view of the different links that exist between the different services at
each level.
The congestion curves also have an important impact on the properties of the model,
especially since, through the use of generalised prices, any reduction in mileage can
potentially have a positive welfare effect by reducing travel times. Speed-flow curves are
calibrated on the basis of German data (Bundesministerium für Verkehr, 1993) and other
information (Kirwan HWDO, 1994), as well as projections for specific cities (presented in Van
DenderHWDO 1997)). The values of time for different trip types are also very important
parameters. Their values were taken from a benchmark study by the Hague Consulting
Group (1992). The average value of time in urban driving is between five and six ECU per
hour.
Table 4 presents a number of important implicit long run elasticities of EUCARS that have
been used to calibrate the model. These values are close to comparable long run elasticities
presented in Goodwin (1992), Gwilliam et al. (1991), de Jong (1989, 1991), Koopman
(1992) and Oum et al. (1992). Important characteristics are the complementarity between
                                                
36  This is a relatively high substitution elasticity, chosen after comments received on previous versions of
EUCARS.48
car usage and car ownership, as well as the induced increase in traffic volume following an
increase in infrastructure (last row). Time effects are far from negligible, for example to
increase public transport attractiveness.
It should be noted that the possibility of obtaining accurate estimates of the elasticities
presented in Table 4 for the European Union as a whole is limited. In the absence of a
comprehensive data set for Europe, the necessary econometric work cannot be carried out
and use must be made of "mean elasticities" (based on a wide variety of country studies)
reported in the literature. However, since there is a reasonable degree of convergence across
a number of main studies, the rough orders of magnitude are known for most of the key
(implicit) elasticities (for an informal and highly useful description, see in particular
Gwilliam et al. (1991)).
 0DLQGDWDVRXUFHV
All data on the size and composition of the car fleet (by vintage and technology) have been
taken from the FOREMOVE database, which in turn is based on CORINAIR. Moreover,
this database also provided the average speeds at various locations, the average annual
mileage (by location, vintage and technology), and the key relationships between emissions
and fuel use per kilometre on the one hand and vehicle speeds on the other. Furthermore,
whereas scrappage has been endogenised in EUCARS, the scrappage equations have been
calibrated to be consistent with the survival curves used in FOREMOVE. The strong
reliance on FOREMOVE has two related explanations. The first is that the underlying
database is one of the most complete available. Secondly, FOREMOVE was chosen to
model road transport emissions for the AUTO/OIL I programme, in which EUCARS was
used as one of the tools for assessing the cost-effectiveness of various policy measures to
limit emissions.
Data on individual cost components come from a variety of sources. Fuel prices are taken
from data compiled by DG XVII. Information on purchase and circulation tax levels is from
a compendium drawn up by ACEA (1993). Information on other car cost components is
largely based on SEO (1992) which contains detailed cost statistics by vehicle category for
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Denmark, France and Italy. These data
have been weighted and additional calculations were undertaken in order to ensure
compatibility with the underlying structure of EUCARS (see Denis (1998) for more detail).
Data from the EUROSTAT (1996) budget survey were used to verify the resulting budget
shares for transport (as well as for public and private transport individually). Data from a
variety of sources on modal split (reported in Koopman (1992)) were used to determine the
annual mileage by public transport.
In the production block, the average values by fuel and vehicle size are taken from the DRI
database on new cars (1993). These values are used to calibrate the production block for the
1991-1996 period. Benchmark cost curves come from the OECD (Michaelis, 1996) study as
already mentioned. The main source for engine and fuel emission technologies is Touche
Ross (1995).49
 6,08/$7,213523(57,(6$1'5(68/76
EUCARS 3.0 has been used to carry out a cost-effectiveness analysis of policies to reduce NOX
and CO2 emissions. This chapter briefly presents some of the results to illustrate the simulation
properties of the model; for a full overview, the reader is referred to Jansen and Denis (1998).
Figure 4 gives an overview of the discounted welfare costs of a series of policy measures and
their effect on urban NOX emissions. These simulations have been carried out assuming that the
Marginal Cost of Public Funds equals 1.0. This assumes that tax revenues from transport are
returned in a lump sum manner to consumers and are not used to cut highly distortionary taxes
elsewhere in the economy. The somewhat irregular form of some curves can be explained by the
fact that the different emission reducing technologies are not continuous. For technical changes
imposed by uniform standards, another reason is that costs increase quite differently across
vehicle categories as standards are tightened.
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Road pricing (.03 to .21 ECU/km, only imposed in urban areas at peak hours)
CO2 tax
Annual tax based on NOx emission factor and mileage
Annual tax based on NOx emission factor 
Technical norms (uniform imposition of standards)
Revenue neutral system of purchase incentives based on NOx emission factor
Purchase subsidy for low emission (NOx) cars
Revenue neutral system of purchase subsidy + annual tax (NOx dependent)
Combination of purchase subsidy and annual tax (NOx dependent)
The results illustrate that, for small emission reductions (of the order of 5%), the costs of various
instruments are comparable. At these levels of emission reductions, policies that directly target
vehicle emissions (e.g. emission standards and emission-related vehicle taxes) do not outperform
measures that cut emissions by reducing vehicle mileage (e.g. road pricing, fuel (CO2) taxation).
This is because the latter policies reduce congestion; the benefits of which largely offset the
welfare costs of reduced vehicle mileage.
However, the analysis also shows that significant emission reductions can only be achieved
through policies that directly affect vehicle emission technology. The costs of measures that50
mainly curb mobility rise exponentially as the congestion-reducing benefits taper off and are
outweighed by the exponentially increasing dead-weight burden of taxation.
Interestingly, vehicle emission standards are also more cost-effective than annual taxes related to
vehicle emissions, even when the latter are based on mileage and emissions per kilometre. The
reason for this counter-intuitive result is the high degree of myopism assumed, which implies
that the annual tax has to be very significant to give consumers and manufacturers incentives to
switch to clean technologies. As a result, the welfare losses on account of reductions in mileage
are larger than the efficiency advantages of emission taxes over standards (i.e. the equalisation of
the marginal costs across different vehicle categories).
This result can be changed by the introduction of fiscal purchase incentives dependent on car
emissions. These purchase incentives directly target the consumer purchase decision and can be
considered as a tool for correcting consumers’ insufficient accounting of future costs (myopism).
Purchase incentives can be implemented as pure subsidy or in a revenue neutral manner,
implying net taxes on high emission technologies, the revenues of which are recycled to
subsidise low emission technologies. As such, the instrument is analogous to a gas-guzzler
tax/sipper rebate. The policy appears to be cost-effective when subsidy levels are significant so
that the additional costs due to technological changes are (more than) fully offset by subsidies.37
When the purchase instrument is introduced in combination with emission-based annual taxes,
the direct targeting of the purchase decision turns out to be highly cost-effective. The results
show that this combination can achieve emission reductions at about half the cost of standards,
depending on the precise formulation of the scheme (particularly the mix between annual taxes,
purchase incentives and the impact on government spending).
The ranking of policy instruments changes significantly when the marginal costs of public funds
are evaluated at 1.25 instead of 1.0. Since this assumes that tax revenues from transport are put to
good use elsewhere in the economy, instruments that raise revenues become more attractive, as
Emission-related taxes and road pricing now become negative cost policy instruments for
achieving emission reductions of up to 20%. The V-shaped forms of the cost curves for these
instruments can be explained by the fact that as charges increase, the associated benefits from
government revenues increase in a linear manner, whereas the distortionary effects cause
exponentially rising costs. Most purchase incentive and combined emission tax/purchase
incentive schemes simulated are revenue neutral and therefore not affected by the pricing of
public funds. However, it is still possible to design a (revenue-raising) scheme that is cost-
effective for emissions reductions. Since evaluation of the welfare costs of direct regulations
hardly changes compared to the previous case, this implies that economic instruments and, in
particular, road pricing (reductions up to 20%) and combined emission tax/purchase incentive
schemes (further reductions) are the most efficient policy instruments available.
Figure 5 shows. Conversely, subsidies (or instruments that lead to revenue losses for the
government) become more costly.
Emission-related taxes and road pricing now become negative cost policy instruments for
achieving emission reductions of up to 20%. The V-shaped forms of the cost curves for these
instruments can be explained by the fact that as charges increase, the associated benefits from
                                                
37 Note, however, that this conclusion is only valid for a low marginal cost of public funds (MCPF=1).51
government revenues increase in a linear manner, whereas the distortionary effects cause
exponentially rising costs. Most purchase incentive and combined emission tax/purchase
incentive schemes simulated are revenue neutral and therefore not affected by the pricing of
public funds. However, it is still possible to design a (revenue-raising) scheme that is cost-
effective for emissions reductions. Since evaluation of the welfare costs of direct regulations
hardly changes compared to the previous case, this implies that economic instruments and, in
particular, road pricing (reductions up to 20%) and combined emission tax/purchase incentive
schemes (further reductions) are the most efficient policy instruments available.
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Road pricing (.03 to .21 ECU/km, only imposed in urban areas at peak hours)
CO2 tax
Annual tax based on NOx emission factor and mileage
Annual tax based on NOx emission factor
Technical norms (uniform imposition of standards)
Revenue neutral system of purchase incentives based on NOx emission factor
Purchase subsidy for low emission (NOx) cars
Revenue neutral system of purchase subsidy + annual tax (NOx dependent)
Combination of purchase subsidy and annual tax (NOx dependent)
Most adjustments occur in the first two periods (ten years) after introduction of a new policy.
This is illustrated by Table 5, which presents the results for the example of a combined
tax/purchase incentive tool where taxation revenues are recycled to stimulate the introduction of
low emission technologies.
As can be seen from this table, emission taxes lead to the introduction of different clean
technology packages in the various vehicle categories.  They also cause a non-negligible
scrapping of old vehicles in the first period: old vehicles have high emissions per kilometre and
the new emission tax therefore implies that their use becomes relatively expensive: as demand
drops, second hand prices fall, implying that, for more cases than in the baseline, investments in
maintenance and repair are no longer economically justified. Higher scrappage results.
Obviously, as new vehicle purchases lead to a “cleaner” fleet, this effect gradually disappears
over time. However, as the purchase incentive is maintained throughout the simulation period,
more new cars are bought, and leading to additional scrappage. Once the fleet is renewed (90%52
after 15 years (three periods)) a new equilibrium is reached, with more car ownership and less car
use.
7DEOH6LPXODWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKHFRPELQHGLPSRVLWLRQRIDQDQQXDOURDGWD[EDVHGRQ
PLOHDJHDQG12[HPLVVLRQIDFWRUV(&8J12[LQDGGLWLRQWRDV\VWHPRISXUFKDVH
VXEVLG\IRUORZHPLVVLRQFDUV(&8SHUJ12[NPDERYHXQGHUJNP
Key variables First 5-year period Second  5-year
period
Third 5-year period
1. Technology effect diesel cars: package 1
gasoline cars: small: package 2 / medium and large: package 3
2. Volume effect
Fleet size
Total mileage
+0.72%
-1.68%
+0.76%
-1.41%
+0.98%
-1.11%
2ZQHUVKLS  XVDJH
FRVWVDYHUDJH   
3. Speed change
Urban peak hour
Highways
+1.23%
+0.46%
+1.12%
+0.42%
+0.93%
+0.37%
4. Age effect
Average fleet age
New cars purchase
Scrappage
-0.86%
+2.35%
+0.90%
-0.69%
+1.73%
+1.83%
-0.7%
+2.1%
+1.8%
2ZQHUVKLSXVDJHFRVWV
QHZFDUV
ROGFDUV






6HFRQGKDQG SULFHV RI
FDUV   
5. Composition effect
Small gasoline cars
Medium gasoline
Large gasoline cars
Diesel cars
+1.76%
+0.55%
-0.54%
-0.65%
+1.83%
+0.67%
-0.47%
-0.71%
+2.07%
+0.96%
-0.19%
-0.71%
3XUFKDVHSULFHQHZ
VPDOOJDVROLQH
PHGLXPJDVROLQH
ODUJHJDVROLQH
GLHVHO












6HFRQGKDQGSULFHV
VPDOOJDVROLQH
PHGLXPJDVROLQH
ODUJHJDVROLQH
GLHVHO












6. Public transport
change +0.89%  0.92% +0.69%53
A. Emission effects
Urban NOx
Urban PM
CO2 emissions
-18.31%
-9.61%
-1.54%
-36.23%
-17.16%
-1.28%
-45.24%
-20.74%
-1.01%
B. Change in
government revenues
from transport
of which
   purchase tax/subsidy
   annual emission tax
   fuel related taxes
+1.57%
-4.92%
+7.37%
-0.88%
0.0%
-5.06%
+5.77%
-0.71%
- 0.93%
-5.11%
+4.71%
-0.53%
C. Net welfare costs
Pure welfare costs
Time costs
Rev. losses(+)/gains(-)
    TOTAL
    TOTAL (%baseline
spending on transport
services)
44.22  bn ECUs
-31.88  bn ECUs
-11.41  bn ECUs
0.93  bn ECUs
-0.02%
47.39 bn ECUs
-31.08  bn ECUs
0.04  bn ECUs
16.34  bn ECUs
-0.25%
38.09  bn ECUs
-28.44  bn ECUs
7.99  bn ECUs
17.64  bn ECUs
-0.26%
The welfare effects change significantly over time because the costs of new technology
investments increase over time, in line with the penetration of clean vehicle technologies in the
vehicle fleet.  This is hard to see from Table 5 because the “pure welfare costs” in the table
decrease in line with reductions in annual emission taxes (due to erosion of the tax base).
However, if this effect (which is welfare neutral as it implies consumer gains and roughly
equivalent losses for the government due to only limited impact on consumer behaviour) is
discounted, it is clear that welfare losses related to more expensive vehicle technology increase
over time (the welfare effects of reduced congestion are stable).  In contrast with the present
simulation, it should be noted that policies that do not affect the level and composition of the
vehicle fleet are characterised by a near full attainment of the new equilibrium in the first period.
Some characteristics of the NOX emissions simulations are also found in simulations that aim to
reduce CO2 emissions, presented in Figure 7. These results demonstrate that a CO2 tax can
achieve significant emission reductions at low cost: apart from its effect on vehicle fuel economy
(both at the technical level and at the fleet composition level) it also reduced mileage, which at
low levels has a positive welfare effect because it reduces congestion.  As expected, fuel taxes
are much more efficient than road pricing or other mileage-related taxes that do not give an
incentive to improve fuel economy.54
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Road pricing (.03 to .21 ECU/km, only imposed in urban areas at peak hours)
CO2 tax
Annual tax based on NOx emission factor and mileage
Fuel consumption norms
Gas-guzzler tax/sipper rebate at purchase (based on CO2)
Combination of purchase subsidy + fuel tax (both CO2 dependant)
However, given the significant degree of assumed consumer myopism, a gas guzzler tax/sipper
rebate is the most cost-effective policy instrument available (see also Koopman, 1995). This
revenue neutral tool adequately corrects for high consumer discount rates, which distort the
private purchase decision. The degree of myopism assumed in EUCARS and the fuel economy
cost curves used imply that CO2 emissions from passenger cars can be cut by some 15% at zero
cost.  This result depends critically on the shape of the cost curves: as indicated in Section 3.4,
available evidence suggests that small improvements (up to 15%) could be produced at very low
cost.  This, in turn, would also imply that some forms of direct regulation of fuel economy could
be low cost.  This counter-intuitive result in a situation where some 60% of fuel prices consist of
excise duties and where improved fuel efficiency leads to increased congestion hinges crucially
on the very low costs of marginal improvements in fuel economy. 38
Efficient measures for large CO2 emission reductions require technical change, as is the case with
NOx emissions. Emission-lowering technology differs for CO2 and NOx, so measures to lower
CO2 do not, in general, cut NOx emissions as well. However, synergy effects do exist for small
emission reductions through behaviour change (mileage reduction).
                                                
38  Obviously, one could question the relatively very high implicit CO2 taxes on transport compared to other sectors
of the economy.  Whilst these may be justified by other policy objectives, they do not seem to be efficient from
a global CO2 perspective.  However, these deliberations relate to the global cost-effectiveness of CO2 emission
reduction policies.  Within the partial context of EUCARS and given relatively high fuel prices, consumer
myopism leads to a no-regret potential.55
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The EUCARS model permits a detailed cost-effectiveness evaluation of various fiscal and non-
fiscal policy tools used to limit air emissions and curb congestion. It was originally designed and
is particularly well suited for analysis of various fiscal instruments, owing to its detailed
representation of the tax system. But it is also suitable for analysis of other instruments targeting
the car fleet (new standards, scrappage incentives), as well as instruments influencing car usage
(road pricing and, albeit to a smaller extent, traffic management policies). As the cost concept
used in EUCARS comprises the costs of behavioural adjustments and time spent in transport, it
provides a common yardstick for evaluating very different policy instruments. By comparison,
traditional analyses of air quality policies are limited to comparison of the technical costs of
different emission standards, therefore ignoring behavioural reactions, as well as the potential
contribution of changing other determinants of emissions (car usage, fleet structure, ...). Whilst
air quality policies might indirectly affect a wide range of transport decisions that policy makers
may not target intentionally, other transport policies might contribute to reducing road transport
air emissions. Ideally, these interactions should be fully taken into account in developing air
quality measures as well as transport policies.
The simulations reported in Chapter 5, as well as in Koopman (1995), European Commission
(1995) and Jansen and Denis (1998), demonstrate that ignoring all these elements could
potentially prejudice policy choices, so that serious consideration should be given to policy tools
other than standard setting. In addition, by incorporating consumer myopism in an optimising
context, EUCARS reflects a crucial characteristic of vehicle purchase decisions. Large reductions
in air emissions can only be achieved at low cost through changes in emission abatement
technology. Given consumer myopism, cost-effective policy tools must, therefore, target
purchase decisions. Incentive taxes and subsidies prove to be highly cost-effective and allow cost
differences across vehicle categories to be equalised. Single emission standards do not have this
characteristic and are, thus, less cost-effective.
Given these results, and the properties outlined before, the model provides a useful tool for
establishing rough orders of magnitude of the costs of policy instruments to cut emissions.
Moreover, evaluation of the model’s results allows policy analysts to evaluate the different
mechanisms that affect a policy scenario’s outcome. As EUCARS describes a much larger
number of mechanisms than are common in transport/air quality models, this feature is of general
value, even when particular cases are numerically significantly different from the transport
market described in EUCARS.
However, and despite its disaggregated nature, there is still a considerable degree of averaging in
EUCARS, which can significantly affect the results. There is one representative household,
implying that differences across household categories cannot be studied. Since some policy
instruments have significant effects on the composition of the vehicle fleet, and car ownership of
different vintages varies across household categories, this could potentially bias the comparison
of policy measures.  The determination of travel speeds is, of course, highly simplified and
provides only a very crude description of real life. Similarly, the cost and vehicle composition
data represent European averages and hide very significant variations across Member States. This
obviously implies that the results can only be applied to concrete situations after careful analysis.
This can however be overcome easily, provided the necessary data are available: it only requires
a different calibration, not affecting the model structure in itself. Finally, the determination of56
new car supply and vehicle technology choices takes place at a very aggregate level, preventing
an analysis of the impact on different vehicle manufacturers in the European market.
These model features and the stylistic description of passenger transport, mean that the model
results should be interpreted with great care. Moreover, they are also likely to imply a certain
bias against differentiated economic instruments, which derive their cost-effectiveness from
allowing the flattening of cost differences across emission reduction “sources”.  Moreover, the
dynamic effects of economic instruments on R&D and the development of clean technology are
also not taken into account. With these caveats in mind, however, we reiterate that this model is
invaluable for comparing policy options and understanding the work of various interlinked
mechanisms governing transport markets.
Furthermore, various possibilities exist for extending the model to add to its usefulness for policy
evaluation purposes.
First, the current model does not consider road freight transport. Whilst, commercial road
transport only represents approximately 14% of mileage, its share in various emissions (notably
NOx and particulate matter) is very high and increasing due to above average growth rates.
However, road freight transport is an intermediate input and its inclusion in the current model
architecture would therefore require very significant changes.  Since the determinants of demand
differ significantly across passenger and freight transport, it is likely to be more attractive to
develop a separate freight transport model and link it with EUCARS through a combined road
network module.
Secondly, further differentiation of important mechanisms within the current model could also be
attractive, although care has to be taken not to expand the model too much for computational
reasons. However, a more detailed description of the supply side of the car market and the
inclusion of various manufacturers would represent an important improvement and could add to
the insights derivable from the model. The current behavioural assumption (average cost pricing)
is very simplistic and could bias the results.
Thirdly, the inclusion of various household categories would allow distributional effects to be
studied. Such an extension would require significant changes to the model structure, as different
types of consumers would have to be modelled. However, once the calibration data is available,
this merely duplicates (or replicates, depending on how many consumer classes are included) the
equations of the model, through the inclusion of an additional index. This approach is, for
example, followed in TRENEN (De Borger HWDO, 1997).
Finally, the model currently excludes important transport externalities such as accidents and
noise emissions that have significant welfare effects. Inclusion of these transport characteristics
would expand the scope of EUCARS to encompass all major transport externalities.
Incorporating noise and accidents other than through fixed relationships with mileage would
necessitate incorporating new model modules. This could, however, be done without
significantly modifying the current model architecture.
The current model has been used to carry out cost-effectiveness analyses given fixed emission-
reduction targets. In its current form it cannot, however, be utilised to optimise social welfare
(i.e. including the welfare effects of reducing air emissions). This would require formulation of a
different objective function (a social welfare function) which could be maximised subject to
various constraints. In such an approach, the various policy instruments would be endogenous
variables that result from the optimisation process.  The basic structure of the model need not be57
modified to carry out such evaluations, although an appropriate objective function would have to
be formulated and monetary valuations put on the various external costs. Whilst air quality
policies are currently formulated so as to meet emission reduction targets derived from air quality
standards (necessitating a cost-effectiveness approach), a social welfare approach would be an
interesting complementary analysis allowing a further evaluation of the air quality targets.
Finally, EUCARS cannot be used for a spatial evaluation of air quality problems, as it has no
geographical dimension. Whilst this could be built into the model to some extent through further
differentiation of the road networks, a spatial differentiation of the vehicle fleet composition and
behavioural responses is not possible within the current model architecture. These latter features
are, however, important characteristics of air quality problems in Europe. Rather than attempting
to develop the model further, which would require a major extension of its size, it is probably
more attractive to calibrate EUCARS for different regional situations, run independent
simulations of promising policy tools per geographical area and feed these results into a spatial
optimisation model (see, for example, Degraeve and Koopman, 1998, and Denis and Jansen,
1998). This is the favoured approach for the current Auto-Oil II programme.58
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EUCARS 3.0 represents the final stage of a modelling development. This annex describes the
major characteristics of previous model versions. The original model (referred to as EUCARS 1)
was developed in 1994 to study CO2 emission limitation policies in passenger transport. Results of
that model are discussed in Koopman, 1995.
In 1995, the model was expanded to include other externalities: congestion and conventional
emissions. Time costs, emission calculation and technologies to control pollution were therefore
explicitly included in EUCARS 2. EUCARS 2 was intensively used in the context of the first
Auto-Oil programme1, to compare different policy options and to calculate the associated welfare
effects. Simulation results are reported in two European Commission reports (1995a and 1995b).
Another version of EUCARS  2 was also used to support the analysis on "CO2 from cars"
(European Commission, 1996). In this context particular emphasis was given to myopic decisions
regarding fuel economy (resulting in insufficient investment in fuel saving equipment because the
lifelong saving potential is underestimated) and on no-regret policies that would correct this
market failure.
The new version prepared in 1997, EUCARS 3, integrates and improves the previous versions to
enable a comprehensive analysis of the problem of car emissions (Jansen and Denis, 1998). The
baseline version now incorporates myopic behaviour. Modules for fuel economy and congestion
were adjusted on the basis of updated data, and a peak/offpeak differentiation was introduced
along with other minor changes. Assessment of policy measures is therefore refined but also more
complex because of the impact of any single measure on a series of model mechanisms.
The main differences between the different versions of EUCARS are described in more detail
below, following the structure of the main text. The aim is to summarize the changes introduced in
the model, thereby presenting a comprehensive reference to the different versions used for the
various reports. Only differences with respect to EUCARS 3 are presented below. For all the other
features, which are therefore shared with EUCARS 3 version, the reader is refered to the detailed
and comprehensive presentation of the main text.
$*HQHUDOFKDQJHVLQVWUXFWXUH
The basic model structure is the same in all versions of EUCARS. However additional modules
were introduced over time, as can be seen by comparing figure A1, depicting the general structure
in EUCARS 1, with Figure 1 of the main text, which sketches the structure of EUCARS 3.
Time costs and generalised prices including time costs were introduced in EUCARS 2. Speed
determination via speed-flow curves and congestion problems were thus not dealt with in
EUCARS 1. With EUCARS 3 a distinction between peak and off-peak was introduced for the
urban network. This further disaggregation allows for better differentiation of congestion effects
and instruments.
In EUCARS 1, the focus was on CO2 and the module calculating the emissions of conventional
pollutants was only introduced from EUCARS 2 onwards. This module replicates the CORINAIR-
Copert equations, which are speed-dependant. On-road fuel consumption was then also calculated
following the same methodology. As a consequence, a discrepancy was introduced between the
fuel consumption defined in the production block and the real on-road fuel consumption. Other
                                                     
1  Programme jointly launched by the European Commission, the automobile and fuel industries to study the reduction of
noxious emissions from cars.II
production modules were added to determine the car technology and the fuel type that would be
chosen in response to economic incentives to reduce conventional emissions.
The endogenous scrappage feature was introduced in EUCARS  2 (EUCARS  1 used fixed
scrappage rates). The dynamic of the model is the same in all versions and is based on vintage
differentiation, which was not however fully apparent in EUCARS 1.
)LJXUH$. General structure of the model      EUCARS 1.
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$&RQVXPSWLRQPRGXOH
The decision tree was expanded in EUCARS 2 and EUCARS 3. Levels 7 and 8, and the split of the
binary choice at level 4 (OLD and NEW) into five vintage categories (NEW, MOINS1, MOINS2,
MOINS3 and MOINS4) were added to EUCARS 2 (compare Figure A2 and A3 with Figure 2 in
the main text). The functional form of this level was also changed, from an Indirect Addilog
Demand System (IADS) to a CES function. Key parameters of the functions used in the
consumption module were also slightly modified.
The decision tree has been further expanded in EUCARS 3, with the introduction of a ninth nest.
Key parameters were again modified to keep implicit elasticities at levels consistant with the
literature, after the introduction of the short-sightedness assumption and the other changes in the
fuel economy and speed modules, which requested significant adjustments.
)XQFWLRQDOIRUPVXVHGLQWKHFRQVXPSWLRQPRGXOH
The functional form of level 4 (choice between new or second-hand car services) was modelled
through IADS (Indirect Addilog Demand System) in EUCARS 1.
The budget share expression of an IADS function in the case of two independent variables is
written as follows:
Z
Z
S
\
S
\
S
\
S
\
S
\
S
\
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
=
+
=
+
-
--
-
--
b
bb
b
bb
s
ss
s
ss
The following expressions for the demand equation and the different price and income elasticities
can subsequently be derived.
For the demand equation
qi = bi (p1 /y)1-si     /      S
k bk (pk/y)1-sk . y/pi
For the income elasticity:
Ei = 1+si - S
k wk . sk
For the (own) price elasticity
Eii = - wi (1-si) - si
For the cross price elasticity
Eij = - wj (1-sj)
In EUCARS 1, the aggregation of prices at this level was done by means of a geometric average, as
for the LES function (level 5).
budget the in of share with P N Z S N
N
Z
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)LJXUH$. Consumption module EUCARS 1.
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)LJXUH$. Consumption module EUCARS  2.
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$3ULFHIRUPDWLRQFDUPDUNHWHQGRJHQRXVVFUDSSDJHPRGHOG\QDPLFV
*HQHUDOLVHGFRVWV
As explained above, time constraint and transport time costs were not considered in
EUCARS 1.  The  full  income  concept  and  the  generalised  costs  were  thus  not
relevant for EUCARS 1. Consequently, in EUCARS 1 the prices referred only to
the monetary costs.
&RVWVDQGSULFHVRQFDUPDUNHWV
In addition to the inclusion of time costs, fiscal instruments were not as detailed in
EUCARS 1 as they are in EUCARS 3 (VAT rates were included in the taxation of
cars and fuels but not distinguished from other taxes in EUCARS 1).
In EUCARS 1, the cost of car usage was modelled as:
PCTSGAusage = VCE + FEFF * PFUEL (1+VCP),
with:
- VCE, exogenous component for the variable costs
(reflecting oil use, mileage dependent insurance etc.),
- FEFF, fuel use per kilometre
- PFUEL, the price net of taxes for a specific fuel type,
- VCP, ratio of fuel taxation (excises and VAT) over fuel price.
Ownership costs are based on a capital cost approach and comprise two exogenous
parameters together with two endogenous variables (capital costs and
depreciation). The equation is unchanged, but the construction of these endogenous
variables  has  been  slightly  modified.  In  EUCARS 1  it  was  assumed  that  the
average old car had a remaining economic "life" of five years:
DEPR = 5 * (OCMP/5)
where OCMP stands for the second-hand price of this type of car. The capacity
costs were thus equal to:
CAPCF = INT/100 (5 OCMP - 10 DEPRt) = INT/100 * 3 OCMP
Purchase prices of new cars include taxation in the following way:
NCPC = NCPP* (1+OCP) + TAX(FEFF - TFEFF)
with:
- NCPC, consumer price of a new car,
- NCPP, producer price of a new car,
- TAX, the gas-guzzler tax (alternatively sipper rebate) per l/100km above
(respectively under) the "target" fuel use,
- FEFF, fuel use per kilometreVII
- TFEFF, "target" fuel use per kilometre
- OCP, ratio of car taxation (purchase tax and VAT) over car price.
EUCARS 2 equations are similar to EUCARS 3 equations given in the main text.
$JHVFUDSSDJHDQGYLQWDJHV
The distinction between separate vintages in the consumption block was only made
in EUCARS 2. In comparison EUCARS 1 only had one homogenous category for
old cars, and only one second-hand market – and thus one price – per vehicle
category. However, the composition of the "old" vehicle fleet was explicitly based
on detailed information on vintages.
The scrappage rates of old cars in every vintage were therefore fixed in
EUCARS 1, so as to give an approximation of the "average" life cycle of cars:
VCTSGCold = 0.90 MOINS1+ 0.45 MOINS2 + 0.05 MOINS3 + 0.00 MOINS4
with VCTSGCold, the total volume of old cars, and MOINS1 to MOINS4 the
number of new cars in period T-1 to T-4. This meant that:
- after one period, 90% of the cars originally sold remain on the market,
- after 2 periods, 45% of the cars originally sold remain on the market,
- after 3 periods, 5% of the cars originally sold remain on the market,
- no cars remain on the market after 4 periods.
This structure is a reasonable approximation of the average FOREMOVE survival
curves, and parameters of the endogenous scrappage equation in EUCARS 2 and 3
were calibrated to keep the same profile.
The endogenous scrappage module was slightly modified between version 2 and
version  3  to  introduce  emission  based  taxes.  The  EUCARS 2  equation  for
endogenous scrappage included one additional b parameter  whose  value  varied
between 0.2 and 0.8 according to car age. This "breakdown rate" indicated the
"breakdown" frequency and thereby the number of occasions when the car owner
would compare repair costs and second-hand prices:
[] {} ESCRAP EXSCRAP Stock
OCMP RC
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This equation was simplified in EUCARS 3 by putting b at 1.0.
Transition matrices between car technology and car vintage entered the model in
EUCARS 2 only.VIII
$3URGXFWLRQEORFNV
The endogenous determination of the emission characteristics of cars and fuels (§
3.4.2 and § 3.4.3) was added in EUCARS 2. The production block of EUCARS 1
only determined the optimal fuel efficiency of new cars, on the basis of assumed
perfect rationality of economic agents.
The main change introduced in EUCARS 3 is the short-sightedness assumption. In
previous versions economic agents were assumed to take into account the full
(discounted) benefit of the fuel saving devices that could be installed in new cars;
these benefits were discounted over the life of the car with a rational discount rate
of 7% (the rate used for capital costs). As explained in the main text, this
assumption is now replaced by an overdiscounting assumption (a 50% rate is used)
which seems to better fit observed behaviour. The shift from a rational to a short-
sighted assumption does not change the principle nor the equations; it alters only
the Z quantity, which is the expected future mileage taken into account when
purchasing a new car.
However, the cost curves used in the production block were also changed, in line
with new data. The fuel efficiency module of EUCARS  1 and EUCARS  2 is
presented in box A1.
Given the database and the functional forms chosen, the imposition of myopic
behaviour led to a different model, in that key parameters and elasticities changed
with respect to the rational version. This implied that the baseline also changed and
that, therefore, one can not directly compare simulation results with the two models
since they are expressed as differences with respect to the baseline.
%2;$6SHFLILFIXHOFRQVXPSWLRQDVPRGHOOHGLQ(8&$56DQG(8&$56
Vehicle producers select technical characteristics of the vehicle so that the models they put
on the market have the lowest obtainable lifetime costs per kilometre given prevailing taxes,
interest rates, fuel prices, other cost components, and actual mileage. Hence, vehicle
producers effectively compare the cost of producing a cost-saving device (e.g. of lighter
materials leading to lower fuel use per kilometre) with the lifetime cost savings that accrue
to the consumer as a result. Such an outcome would prevail if consumers based their
vehicle purchase decisions on lifetime costs.
The specific fuel consumption of new cars is obtained by equalising the marginal benefit of
fuel efficiency to consumers (i.e. reductions in discounted fuel bills) and the marginal costs
of improving fuel efficiency. The starting relation is the following:
dRF/d(1/FEFF) = dNCPC/d(1/FEFF)
in which FEFF is the fuel consumption, NCPC represents consumer vehicle prices and RF
stands for the discounted vehicle lifetime fuel costs.  RF can be written explicitly as:
RF = FEFF*(PFUEL+VCP)*Z
where Z is the discounted value of lifetime mileage, PFUEL the fuel price and VCP the fuel
taxes.IX
Producer and consumer prices of vehicles are then determined by:
NCPP =  W exp [a 1/FEFF TIME]
NCPC = (1+ OCP) * (NCPP + TAX (FEFF - TFEFF))
in which:
W, a are vehicle type specific constants,
NCPP, NCPC are, respectively, the producer and consumer price of new cars,
OCP is the DGYDORUXP purchase tax (expressed as a percentage)
TIME is a fixed shift parameter of autonomous technical progress
Costs of improving fuel efficiency increase exponentially.  As purchase taxes are DG
YDORUHP in the model, increases in producer prices following improved fuel efficiency are
translated proportionally into consumer prices.  These equations can be re-written to arrive
at the following expression for optimal fuel efficiency:
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Figure A4 presents the resulting cost curve of reducing fuel use for medium gasoline,
diesel and LPG vehicle respectively, compared with a US study (ACEEE (1992)) based on
a detailed bottom-up engineering study.
)LJXUH$. Cost curves for fuel economy, used in EUCARS 1 and EUCARS 2.
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$)XHOXVHDQGFRQYHQWLRQDOHPLVVLRQV
The fuel efficiency used in the consumption module of EUCARS 1 was identical to
the fuel efficiency computed in the production block. Calibration was based on
apparent fuel consumption and estimates of the relative fuel efficiency of
small/medium/large cars and new/old cars. This also meant that fuel use in
EUCARS 1 was not dependent on speed (which was not modelled in EUCARS 1).
EUCARS 2  and  EUCARS 3  use  Copert  relationships  for  on-road  fuel
consumption. Cold start extra consumption was however only introduced in
EUCARS 3.
The air emissions of conventional pollutants were not computed in EUCARS 1.X
$&RQJHVWLRQFXUYHVDQGVSHHGGHWHUPLQDWLRQWUDYHOWLPHV
Not relevant for EUCARS 1.
Speed-flow  curves  were  changed  in  EUCARS 3  when  the  peak/offpeak
differentiation was introduced.
For reference, information on speed-flow curves in EUCARS 2 is given in box A2.
%2;$6SHHGIORZFXUYHVDVPRGHOOHGLQ(8&$56
EUCARS 2 contains an aggregate speed-flow curve per network (rural, urban, highway).
These curves link average travel time (1/speed) and total number of kilometres performed
on each network in the following way:
Time traffic network network =+ ZH[ S  aa
b
12
where  traffic represents the capacity utilisation of the infrastructure (the level of
infrastructure by location is determined exogenously):
traffic km INFRA network
triptype generation size
= å å å
and where Z aab 12 are parameters specific to the individual locations. The
parameters of the functions have been chosen to express the relative absorption capacity
and maximum speed of each network. Figure A5 presents the three congestion curves.
)LJXUH$. Congestion curves used in EUCARS 2.
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The addition of the time dimension in EUCARS 2 modified relative prices. The
structure of the decision tree was also altered. It was thus necessary to modify some
explicit elasticities and parameters of EUCARS 1 in order to keep the same orderXI
of magnitude for the implicit key elasticities in both versions. Values of some
implicit elasticities for EUCARS 1 are given in KOOPMAN (1995).
Implicit elasticities in two different versions of EUCARS 2 are summarised below.
The first version is the one used to obtain the results described in the interim report
on the cost-effectiveness of measures to reduce conventional emissions (EC,
1995a). The model was then finalised, and slightly modified to account for the
comments received, before the final report was written (EC, 1995b). A major
change between the two versions is the completion of the production blocks for
fuel and car emission technologies, broadening the range of policy instruments that
could be assessed, while the modification most noticeable in the tables concerns
the doubling of the substitution elasticity between public and private passenger
transport following external advice.
7DEOH$ Implicit elasticities of EUCARS 2.0
               (Version used for EC, 1995a)
Effects of
on:
car ownership car usage
average travel
time
by cars
in urban area
use of public
transport
government
tax revenues
increase of 1% of
fuel prices
- 0.13 % - 0.18 % -0.15 % + 0.09 % + 0.30 %2
increase of 1% of
new car prices
- 0.44 % - 0.21 % - 0.17 % + 0.16 % - 0.02 %3
diminution of 1%
of public transport
price
- 0.02 % -0.02 % - 0.02 % + 0.50 % - 0.02 %
diminution of 1%
of travel time via
public transport
- 0.04 % - 0.05 % - 0.04 % + 0.95 % - 0.05 %
increase of 1% of
infrastructure
(roads)
+ 0.08 % + 0.23 % - 0.62 % + 0.17 % + 0.12 %
7DEOH$ Implicit elasticities of EUCARS 2.3
               (Version used for EC, 1995b and EC, 1996)
Effects of
on:
car ownership car usage
average travel
time
by cars
in urban area
use of public
transport
government
tax revenues
increase of 1% of
fuel prices
- 0.14 % - 0.15 % -0.12 % + 0.22 % + 0.02 %
2
increase of 1% of
new car prices
- 0.51 % - 0.32 % - 0.25 % + 0.61 % - 0.02 %
3
                                                     
2 Excises on fuel are also increased by 1%.
3The increase in new car prices is not realised through taxation.XII
diminution of 1%
of public transport
price
- 0.11 % -0.11 % - 0.11 % + 0.95 % - 0.01 %
diminution of 1%
of travel time via
public transport
- 0.21 % - 0.22 % - 0.17 % + 1.82 % - 0.025 %
increase of 1% of
infrastructure
(roads)
+ 0.10 % + 0.20 % - 0.62 % + 0.17 % + 0.01 %
$'DWDVRXUFHV
There are no major changes in data sources for the common variables, except, as
already mentioned before, as far as the fuel economy cost curves and speed-flow
relationships are concerned.XIII
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A           Aspect
ABC         position in FEFFrel
ACT         Activity
C           Characteristic
G           Generation vintaGe
H           Aliased with G
I           Intensity of a technology instrument
II          fuel package
IM          I and M scheme intensity
J           instrument
L           Location
LL          Aliased with L
N           Network
NEWTEC      new technologies (after catalyst intro)
O           age of Old vehicles
OLDTEC      old (conventional) technologies
P           Petrol car size
PK          Period
POL         POLlutants
PPK         Aliased with PK
R           Aliased with S
S           vehicle Size
SIZETEC     correspondance between size and technologies
T           simulation period
TEC         TEChnology
TT          Trip Types
TX          origin of tax revenues
U           Aliased with TT
V           possible periods
<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<HDUV￿LQ￿WKH￿OLIH￿RI￿D￿FDU￿DV￿DQ￿ROG￿FDU
<($5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<($5V￿LQ￿WKH￿OLIH￿RI￿D￿FDU
$3DUDPHWHUV
A1RC        alpha first level rest consumption
A1TR        alpha first level transport
A2PR        alpha second level private transport services
A2PU        alpha second level public transport services
A3          alpha CES function            third level
A4          alpha CES function            fourth level
A5          alpha coefficient             fifth level
A7          alpha coefficient             seventh level
A8          alpha coefficient             eighth level
A9          alpha coefficient             ninth level
ACOLD       affix for ratiocold relationship
ACOLDF      affix for ratiocold relationship fuel consumption
ADDSCRAP    additional scrappage                10000 ECU p car p year
AGE         average age of a vintage
ALPH        speed curve parameter
ALPHAF      alpha coefficient in cost curves   mult in Exp
AVGAGE      average age of the car stock
AVGAGES     average age of the car stock by S
AVGEM       computed average of CO2 emission    tCO2 per l
AVGEMG      emissions by G POL                  g per km
AVGEMI      emissions by S G L POL              g per km
AVGEMISF    average emission factor             g per km
AVGEML      emissions by L POL                  g per km
AVGEMS      emissions by S POL                  g per km
AVGEMSG     emissions by S G POL                g per km
AVGEMT      emissions by S TEC L POL            g per km
AVGEXHAUST  baseline exhaust emiss factor       kg p km
AVGFEFF     computed average FEFF               l per 100 km
AVGFTECH    average technical FEFF              l per 100 km
AVGKM       mean annual mileage                 100 000 km
AVGSPEED    average speed in km per hour
AVGSPEEDL   time by S and Location
B5          beta coeffecient              fifth level
BAVGEMSG    baseline emissions by S G POL       g per km
BCOLD       coefficient for ratiocold relationshipXIV
BCOLDF      coefficient for ratiocold relationship fuel consumption
BETA        infrastructure parameter
BETACOLD    share of cold mileage
BUDG0       budget total consumption including value of time
BVCTSGA     baseline volume by size generation and aspect        Mio cars
CC          total cost to the producer of the IIth package       10**6 ECU
CO2         total CO2 emissions                 Mio tCO2 per 5 years
CO2PU       tCO2 per unit of public transport services
COEFE       coefficients in emissions formula
COEFF       coefficients in FEFF CORINAIR relationships
CORR        correcting factor for the differences in consumption
COST        additional cost to the producer     10000 ECU p car
COSTPL      cost per litre of the chosen package II              ECU p 1000 l
CSCRAP      cumulated previous to 1990 scrappages                Mio cars
DEGR        degradation due to the current period
DEGRA       degradation factor exhaust emissions
DISCWELF    discounted welfare                  10 Mrd ECUs
DPRIVWELF   change in private welfare
E           emissions by S TEC L PK POL         1000 t  per year
ECOLD       additional cold start emissions     g per km
ELA         elasticity of speed wrt traffic
ELA1CRC     cross price elasticity of rest of consumption            1st level
ELA1CTR     cross price elasticity of transport services             1st level
ELA1ORC     own price elasticity of rest of consumption              1st level
ELA1OTR     own price elasticity of transport services               1st level
ELA2CPR     cross price elasticity of private transport services     2nd level
ELA2CPU     cross price elasticity of public transport services      2nd level
ELA2OPR     own price elasticity of private transport services       2nd level
ELA2OPU     own price elasticity of public transport services        2nd level
ELA3        own and cross price elasticities          third level
ELA4        own and cross price elasticities          fourth level
ELA7        own and cross price elasticities          seventh level
ELA8        own and cross price elasticities          eighth level
ELA9        own and cross price elasticities          ninth level
ELACROSS    cross price elasticities by S G volumeC   5th level
ELAINC      income elasticities by S G C  fifth level
ELAPRICE    price elasticities by S G C   fifth level
EM          CO2 emission by fuel                tonne CO2 per litre
EMISG       emissions by G POL                  1000 t  per year
EMISL       emissions by L POL                  1000 t  per year
EMISS       emissions by S POL                  1000 t  per year
EMISSG      emissions by S G POL                1000 t  per year
EMISSIONS   emissions by S G L POL              1000 t  per year
EMISSIONT   emissions by S TEC POL              1000 t  per year
EMPU        t pollutant per unit of public transport services
EMPUBTRP    emissions from public transport                      1000 t per 5 y
ETA         elasticity (technical fuel use wrt fuel prices)
EVAPEMIS    baseline evapo emiss factor         kg p car p year
EVAPO       evapo emission factor per P and TEC                  kg per car per period
EVAPOG      evapo emissions                                      t per period
EVAPOGF     evapo emissions                     t per period
EVAPOGG     evapo emissions                     t per period
EVAPOS      evapo emissions                     t per period
EVAPOT      evapo emissions                     t per period
EXSCRAP     exogenous scrappage rate
FCE         exogenous part of fixed costs       5 years 10 000 ECU
FCEPCT90    1990 percentage of maintenance +ins costs in fixed costs
FCP         taxes affecting fixed cost components                10000 ECU
FEFFF       fuel use factor                     l per 10 km
FEFFTECH    technical fuel use i.e. for the production block     l per 10 km
FRED        emissions reduction factor
FREDEVAP    reduction factor for evaporative emissions
FREDEVAPV   reduction factor for evap related to chosen fuel quality
FREDV       reduction factor due to the choice of the fuel package
INDIC       indicator of the type of a polynomial CORINAIR relation
INDIC2      indicates old -i.e. before the base year-  technologies
INDIC3      indicates pre2000 technologies
INDICIM     indicates IeM 2
INDTIMERC   h per day per individual for rest consumption
INFRA       indice of infrastructure level
INT         interest rate
INVTTYPE    determination matrix  from locations to trip types
IRATE       discount rate applicable in the production block
K           degradation factor
K80000      emission degradation after 80 000 km  function of IM POL
K80000V     emissions after 80 000 km  for the period V
KDEGRA      degradation factor according to the IM scheme chosen
KF          emiss factor for car technologiesXV
KFV         reduction factor due to choice of better car technology
KK
KMAX        maximal degradation factor i.e. level of conventional car
KMS         baseline annual mileage             km p car p year
KMSC        baseline cumulated mileage          km p car
KMSG        mileage per car per period          100 000 km
KMSGL       mileage per car per period by L     100 000 km
KMSGLPK     mileage per car per period by N     100 000 km
KTI         relative price of add-on technical improvements
KVM1        degradation factor of the previous period kept in memory
LAMBDAF     delta coefficient in cost curves   Max techn feas    l per 10 km
LIFECOST    additional annual cost              10000 ECU p car p period
LTRIP       trip length by MS                   km
LTRIPAVG    avg EU trip length  km
MILEAGE     total urban mileage per country     1000 km
MINKM       compulsory mileage during five years
NC          number of cars                      Mio cars
NCPP        producer price of new vehicles  i.e. without taxes   10 000 ECU
OCP         purchase taxes   part of price net of tax
OMEGAF      omega coefficient in cost curves   mult
PCRC        value of rest consumption
PCTA        price of cars and car services (avg)  including time costs
PCTGA       price of cars and cars services by G (avg) time costs incl.
PCTSA       price of cars and cars services by S (avg) time costs incl.
PFUEL       fuel price net of taxes             ECU per litre
PROBS       observed survival probability from 1990 to 1995
PTAX        tax or subsidy at purchase          10 ECU per kgpkm
RATIO       ratio of time cost per km between PU and PR
RATIOCO2    1990 part of CO2 emissions from cars attributed to public trp
RATIOCOLD   ratio COLD HOT per pollutant
RATIOCOLDF  ratio COLD HOT for fuel consumption
RATIOF      ratio entre FEFFTECH for T et FEFFTECH for T-1
RATIOFEFF   ratio entre FEFFTECH for T et FEFFTECH for T-1
RCMU        mean of reparation costs following breakdown         10 000 ECU
RCSIGMA     standard deviation of reparation costs               10 000 ECU
RED         reduction factor for evapo emiss
REDV        reduction factor for evap related to chosen car technology
RELWELF     relative to BUDG1 welfare costs changes
REV         government tax revenues
S1          sigma CES function            first level
S2          sigma CES function            second level
S3          sigma CES function            third level
S4          sigma CES function            fourth level
S7          sigma CES function            seventh level
S8          sigma CES function            eighth level
S9          sigma CES function            ninth level
SHAREMIN    share of committed mileage in total mileage in 1990
SHAREPU     location shares for public transport
SPEED       average speed by Location
SPEEDL      average speed by S and L in km per hour
TARGETEXH   emissions target                    kg per km
TAX         tax or rebate given at purchase on the basis of fuel use
TAXEM       annual tax on emissions             10 ECU p g
TAXEMF      annual tax on emission factors
TAXFUEL     tax on fuel emissions  reference rate                ECU p l
TECVINT     conversion matrix from vintages to technologies
TECVINT2    correspondance matrix between new techno and vintages
TEMP        avg EU temperature
TEMPS       seasonal temperature per country
TFEFF       target technical fuel use                            l per 10 km
TIMEFACTOR  indicates autonomous technical progress
TIMEFIXPU   time for 100 km public transport non sensitive to congestion
TIMEL       speed by S and Network
TIMEREST    time spent for rest consumption in milliard h per unit RC
TIMES       ratio between AVGTIMEz and TIMEz
TOTALKM     total mileage during the period                      100 Mrd km
TOTALKMG    total mileage during the period by G                 100 Mrd km
TOTALKMGL   total mileage during the period by G L               100 Mrd km
TOTALKML    total mileage during the period by L                 100 Mrd km
TOTALKMPK   total mileage during the period by PK                100 Mrd km
TOTALKMS    total mileage during the period by S                 100 Mrd km
TOTALKMSG   total mileage during the period by S G               100 Mrd km
TOTPOP      milliards individuals
TOTTIMERC   total time budget in milliards hours for RC per period
TRIPTYPE    determination matrix  from trip types to locations
TVACAR      TVA on new car     part of price net of tax
TVAFUEL     TVA on fuel   percentage
VAOT        value of time per activities        10 ECU per hXVI
VARTIMEPU   part of PU sensitive to congestion
VCE         exogenous variable cost components  ECU per 10 km
VCP         fuel taxes    excises ECU per litre
VCTA        volume of cars and of car services
VCTGA       volume of car services by generation and aspect
VCTSA       volume of cars by size and aspect
VEF         urban mileage by TEC and S
VIE         expected lifetime of a car in the production block
VINT        estimated volume of new cars in previous periods     Mio cars
VINTTEC     conversion matrix from technologies to vintages
VINTTEC2    correspondance matrix between vintages and new techno
VINTTEC3    conversion factor between techno and vint
VINTTECZ    1990 conversion matrix from technologies to vintages
VMAX        average speed in a congestion-free situation         kmph
W1RC        share rest of consumption in total consumption value     1st level
W1TR        share transport consumption in total consumption value   1st level
W2PR        share private transport in total transport value         2nd level
W2PU        share public transport in total transport value          2nd level
W3          shares              third level
W4          shares              fourth level
W5          shares by S G and C
W7          shares by TT        seventh level
W8          shares by L         eighth level
W9          shares by N         ninth level
WELF        welfare
WELFCOST    relative change in WELF times BUDG0 + change in REV
XPCPU       public trp price
XPCTA       price of cars and car services (avg)  without time value
XPCTGA      price of cars and cars services by G (avg) time not incl.
XPCTSA      price of cars and cars services by S (avg) time not incl.
XW1RC       share rest consumption in total monetary consumption     1st level
XW1TR       share transport consumption in total monetary consumption 1st level
XW2PR       share private transport in total transport price         2nd level
XW2PU       share public transport in total transport services price  2nd level
Z           discounted mileage taken into account for purchase decision
ZZ          speed curve parameter
$9DULDEOHV
AVGTIME     average travel time by network                       hour per 100 km
BUDG1       budget total transport services
BUDG2       budget private transport services
BUDG3       budget by size
BUDG4       budget by size and generation
BUDG5       budget by size generation and characteristic
BUDG6       budget by size generation and aspect
BUDG7       budget by size generation and motive
BUDG8       budget by size generation motive and location
CAPC        capital costs of vehicle ownership                   10 000 ECU
CAPUT       index of infrastructure utilisation
CONTROL     control costs                                        10 000 ECU p car
CONTROLC    control costs                                        1 000 000 ECU
DEPR        depreciation of vehicle                              10 000 ECU
DUMMY       dummy var for optimisation        model TRANSPORT
DUMMY2      dummy variable for optimisation
EFEFFTECH   technical fuel efficiency                            l per 10 km
EMISC       emissions costs                                      1 000 000 ECU
EMISCOST    discounted emission costs  with TAXEM or TAXEMF      10 000 ECU p car
EMISCOSTT   total discounted emission costs  with PTAX           10 000 ECU p car
EMISPOL     expected emissions per car (IeM included)            kg pol p car
EMISPOLC    total emissions over 5 year of a S G car             0.1 g pol p car
EMISPOLP    expected emissions per car                           kg pol p car
ENCPC       new vehicles consumer price         10 000 ECU
ENCPP       new vehicles producer price         10 000 ECU
ESCRAP      endogenous scrappage                Mio cars
EXTRA       extra variable for optimisation   model EFFIC
FEFF        total on road fuel use by S G and N                  l per 10 km
FEFFCOLD    extra cold start fuel consumption                    l per 10 km
FEFFT       total on road fuel use by S TEC and N                l per 10 km
FEFFTP      on road fuel use by S TEC and N  no cold start       l per 10 km
NCPC        consumer new car prices (after tax)                  10 000 ECU
OCMP        second-hand car prices                               10 000 ECU
PCPR        value private vehicle services
PCPU        value public transport services
PCTR        value total transport services
PCTS        value by sizeXVII
PCTSG       value by size and generation
PCTSGA      value by size generation and aspect                  10 000 ECU
PCTSGAT     value by size generation and trip type
PCTSGATL    value by S G motive and location
PCTSGATN    generalised price by S G motive and network          ECU per 10 km
PCTSGC      value by size generation and characteristic          10 000 ECU
SPDUMMY
TIME        travel time by S of car and depending on N           hour per 100 km
TIMEPU      public transportation traveltime                     hour per 100 km
TOTALC      total cost to be minimised                           1 000 000 ECU
TOTALCOST   total cost to be minimised (objective variable)      10 000 ECU p car
UPDUMMY
VALPH       speed curve parameter
VCPR        volume of private transport services
VCPU        volume of public transport services
VCRC        volume of non-transport goods and services
VCTR        volume of total transport services
VCTS        volume by size
VCTSG       volume by size and generation
VCTSGA      volume by size generation and aspect                 Mio cars
VCTSGAT     volume by size generation and trip type
VCTSGATL    volume by size generation motive and location
VCTSGATN    volume by size generation motive and network         100 Mrd km
VCTSGC      volume by size generation and characteristic         Mio cars
VELA
X           choice of instrument J intensity I car type S
XX          choice of fuels package II
$(TXDWLRQV
EQ1         current values in 1985
EQ2         current tangent value in 1985
EQ2BPRICE
EQ2PRICE
EQ3PRICE
EQ4PRICE
EQ5PRICE
EQ6APRICE
EQ6BPRICE
EQ7PRICE
EQ8PRICE
EQ9PRICE
EQBUDG1     budget total transport services
EQBUDG2     budget private transport services
EQBUDG3     budget by size
EQBUDG4     budget by size and generation
EQBUDG5     budget by size generation and characteristic
EQBUDG6     budget by size generation and aspect
EQBUDG7     budget by size generation and motive
EQBUDG8     budget by size generation motive and location
EQCAPCN     capacity costs new cars
EQCAPCO     capacity costs old cars (more than 10 y of age)
EQCAPCOB    capacity costs old cars (5 to 10 y old)
EQCAPUT     index of infrastructure utilisation
EQCONTROL   control costs
EQCOST      control costs
EQDEM1RC    CES demand non-transport goods and services
EQDEM1TR    CES demand total transport services
EQDEM2PR    CES demand private transport services
EQDEM2PU    CES demand public transport services
EQDEM3      CES demand by size
EQDEM4      CES demand by size and generation
EQDEM5      LES demand by size generation and aspect
EQDEM6A     ownership demand by size and generation
EQDEM6B     usage demand by size and generation
EQDEM7      CES demand by size generation and motive
EQDEM8      CES demand by size generation and location
EQDEM9      mileage demand by size generation motive and network
EQDEPRN     depreciation of new cars
EQDEPRO     depreciation of old cars (more than 10 y of age)
EQDEPROB    depreciation of old cars (5 to 10 y old)
EQDUMMY     dummy equation for optimisation
EQDUMMY2
EQEFEFFTC   technical fuel efficiency of new vehicles
EQEMISC     total emission costs
EQEMISCIRC  discounted emission costs  with              TAXEMFXVIII
EQEMISCT    total discounted emission costs  with       (TAXEM +) PTAX
EQEMISF     total emission costs
EQEMISPOL   discounted emission costs per pollutant  for TAXEM(F)
EQEMISPOLC  emission costs per car and pollutant for 5 years
EQEMISPOLF  emission costs per car and pollutant for 5 years
EQEMISPOLL  emission costs per pollutant  for            PTAX
EQEMISS     discounted emission costs  with              TAXEM
EQENCPC     consumer price of new vehicles
EQENCPP     producer price of new vehicles
EQEXTRA     extra equation for optimisation
EQFEF1      total consumption incl cold start ’urban’
EQFEF2      total consumption incl cold start ’rural’
EQFEF3      total consumption incl cold start ’hgw’
EQFEFF1     CORINAIR relationship   quadratic form
EQFEFF1B    CORINAIR relationship   for small ece1504 cars urban cdtns
EQFEFF3     CORINAIR relationship   expo type
EQFEFF4     CORINAIR relationship   for preece cars rural cdtns
EQFEFF5     CORINAIR relationship   for diesel cars
EQFEFF6     CORINAIR relationship   for lpg cars   urban cdtns
EQFEFF7     CORINAIR relationship   for lpg cars   rural cdtns
EQFEFF8     CORINAIR relationship   for lpg cars   highway cdtns
EQFEFFC1    conversion FEFFT by TEC to FEFF by G
EQFEFFC2    conversion FEFFT by TEC to FEFF by G new technologies
EQFEFFCOLD  cold start relationship
EQNCPC      consumer new car prices
EQNCPCT     consumer price of a new car  with PTAX
EQOBJ       total costs to minimise
EQOBJF      total cost to minimise
EQPFIX      fixed price of vehicle services (ownership)
EQPFIXC     fixed price of vehicle services  with TAXEMF
EQPFIXM     fixed price of vehicle services  with TAXEM
EQPFIXS     fixed price of vehicle services + add costs of IeM scheme
EQPVAR      variable price of vehicle services (usage)
EQPVARF     variable price of vehicle services  with TAXFUEL
EQPVARM     variable price of vehicle services  with TAXEM
EQSCAPUT
EQSCRAP     scrappage
EQSCRAPM    scrappage  with additional scrappage due to IeM
EQSPCTR
EQSPCURVE1
EQSPCURVE2
EQSPCURVE3
EQSPDUMMY
EQTECH      sum of XXii must equal 1
EQTECH1     sum of Xijs eq 1              for each S and J
EQTECH2     IeM 2 implies CAR 4 5  or 6   for each P
EQTECH2B    IeM 2 implies CAR 4 5  or 6   for each P
EQTIMEPU    travel time using public transport
EQTTIME     average travel time on the network
EQTTIMES    travel time by network and size of the car
EQVOLD      volume of old cars  remaining after scrappage
$0RGHOV
CARCIRCUL   production block with annual tax on emission TAXEMF
CARPROD     production block with annual emission tax TAXEM
CARPRODTAX  production block with emission tax TAXEM and purchase tax or
            incentive PTAX
CARTAX      production block with purchase tax or incentive PTAX
EFFIC
FUELCHOICE  fuel block
FUELTAX     fuel block
SPEEDCURVE
TRANSPORT   transport block without specific policies to control conv. emis.
TRANSPORTC  transport block with annual tax TAXEMF based on emiss. factors
TRANSPORTF  transport block with fiscal incentives for clean fuels
TRANSPORTM  transport block with annual emission tax TAXEM
TRANSPORTS  transport block with IeM scheme
TRANSPORTT  transport block with purchase incentives PTAX
TRANSPOTTM  transport block with purchase incentives PTAX and IeM scheme
TRPMP       transport block with TAXEM and purchase incentives PTAXXIX
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*                                                        *
*                                                        *
*        2. Models                                       *
*        2.1. Declaration of endogenous variables        *
*        2.2. Equations declaration                      *
*        2.3. Equations definition                       *
*        2.4. Model definition                           *
*                                                        *
*                                                        *
*                                                        *
**********************************************************
*** EUCARS is composed of two blocks:
***
*** the first block is commonly referred to as the production block:
***  these models determine the technical characteristics of fuel and new cars
***  (()),&, &$5352’ type, )8(/7$;),
***
*** the latter one (75$163257 type) uses the results of the production block
***  and groups all the other features of EUCARS in 5 main modules.
￿                                                                      
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿￿￿(￿)￿)￿,￿&
￿                                                                      
*** Fuel efficiency model
*** Part of the production block, where fuel efficiency and price
***  of new cars are calculated on the basis of the comparison of the technology cost
***  curve, and of the expected total discounted costs of fuel during the vehicle
***  lifetime
￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
FREE VARIABLE
EXTRA               extra variable for optimisation   model EFFIC
POSITIVE VARIABLES
ENCPP(V,S)          new vehicles producer price   10 000 ECU
ENCPC(V,S)          new vehicles consumer price   10 000 ECU
EFEFFTECH(V,S)      technical fuel efficiency     l per 10 km
;
￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQUATIONS
EQEXTRA             extra equation for optimisation
EQEFEFFTC(V,S)      technical fuel efficiency of new vehicles
EQENCPP(V,S)        producer price of new vehicles
EQENCPC(V,S)        consumer price of new vehicles
;
￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQEFEFFTC(T,S)..  EFEFFTECH(T,S) =E=
  (  (1+OCP(T,S)+TVACAR(T,S)) * ENCPP(T,S) * ALPHAF(S)
    /( (PFUEL(T,S)+VCP(T,S))*(1+TVAFUEL(T,S))*Z(T,S)
     + TAX(T,S)*(1+OCP(T,S)+TVACAR(T,S)) )
   ) **.5 + LAMBDAF(S);
EQENCPP(T,S)..
ENCPP(T,S) =E= OMEGAF(S)*TIMEFACTOR(T)*EXP(ALPHAF(S)/(EFEFFTECH(T,S)-LAMBDAF(S)));
EQENCPC(T,S)..
  ENCPC(T,S) =E= (1+OCP(T,S)+TVACAR(T,S)) *
  ( ENCPP(T,S) + TAX(T,S) * (EFEFFTECH(T,S)-TFEFF(T,S)) );
EQEXTRA..
  EXTRA =E= SUM(T,SUM(S,ENCPC(T,S)));
￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿￿￿G￿H￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿QXX
MODEL EFFIC /EQEFEFFTC, EQENCPP, EQENCPC, EQEXTRA/;
￿                                                                      
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿V￿￿￿&￿$￿5￿3￿5￿2￿’
￿                                                                      
*** Car technology models
*** Part of the production block: choice of anti-polluting devices
***  depending on norms and tax/incentives provided by the government
***
*** The model has different variants depending on the taxation/incentives system
*** Wheter annual tax based on emission factors * mileage   (TAXEM)
***  or    annual tax based on emission factors             (TAXEMF)
***  or    purchase tax/incentive based on emission factors (PTAX/TARGETEXH)
￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
FREE VARIABLES
TOTALCOST           total cost to be minimised (objective variable)   10 000 ECU p car
EMISPOL(S,POLL)     expected emissions per car (IeM included)         kg pol p car
EMISPOLP(S,POLL)    expected emissions per car                        kg pol p car
EMISCOST(S)         discounted emission costs  with TAXEM or TAXEMF   10 000 ECU p car
EMISCOSTT(S)        total discounted emission costs  with PTAX        10 000 ECU p car
POSITIVE VARIABLES
X(J,I,S)            choice of instrument J intensity I car type S
CONTROL(S)          control costs                                     10 000 ECU p car
;
￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQUATIONS
EQEMISPOL(S,POLL)   discounted emission costs per pollutant  for TAXEM(F)
EQEMISPOLL(S,POLL)  emission costs per pollutant  for            PTAX
EQEMISS(S)          discounted emission costs  with              TAXEM
EQEMISCT(S)         total discounted emission costs  with       (TAXEM +) PTAX
EQEMISCIRC(S)       discounted emission costs  with              TAXEMF
EQCOST(S)           control costs
EQOBJ(S)            total costs to minimise
*** Technical constraints
EQTECH1(J,S)        sum of Xijs eq 1              for each S and J
EQTECH2(S)          IeM 2 implies CAR 4 5  or 6   for each P
EQTECH2b(S)         IeM 2 implies CAR 4 5  or 6   for each P
;
￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQEMISPOL(SS,POLL)..
  EMISPOL(SS,POLL) =E= EVAPEMIS(SS,POLL)*((1+IRATE)**VIE - 1)/IRATE/(1+IRATE)**(VIE-1)
                                        * SUM(I, X(’EVAP’,I,SS)*(1-RED(I,SS)) )
    +SUM(  YEAR, KMS(YEAR,SS)*AVGEXHAUST(SS,POLL)
           * SUM(I, X(’CAR’,I,SS)*KF(I,SS,POLL))
           * (1+MIN(  SUM(I,X(’CAR’,I,SS)* DEGRA(’CAR’,I,POLL))
                     *SUM(I,X(’IeM’,I,SS)* DEGRA(’IeM’,I,POLL)) * KMSC(YEAR,SS)/80000
                    ,KMAX(’2000’,SS,POLL)-1 ))
         / (1+IRATE)**(AN(YEAR)-1)  );
EQEMISPOLL(SS,POLL)..
  EMISPOLP(SS,POLL) =E= AVGEXHAUST(SS,POLL) * SUM(I, X(’CAR’,I,SS)*KF(I,SS,POLL))
                       -TARGETEXH(POLL);
EQEMISS(SS)..
  EMISCOST(SS) =E= SUM(POLL, TAXEM(POLL)*EMISPOL(SS,POLL) );
EQEMISCT(SS)..
  EMISCOSTT(SS) =E= EMISCOST(SS)
     +SUM(POLL, PTAX(POLL)*EMISPOLP(SS,POLL) )*(1+TVACAR(’2000’,SS) + OCP(’2000’,SS));
EQEMISCIRC(SS)..
  EMISCOST(SS) =E= SUM(POLL, TAXEMF(POLL)*EMISPOL(SS,POLL)
                  / (SUM(YEAR, KMS(YEAR,SS)/(1+IRATE)**(AN(YEAR)-1))) );
EQCOST(SS)..
  CONTROL(SS) =E= SUM(J, SUM(I, X(J,I,SS)*
  (  COST(J,I,SS)*(1+OCP(’2000’,SS)+TVACAR(’2000’,SS))
   + LIFECOST(J,I)/5 * ((1+IRATE)**VIE - 1)/IRATE/(1+IRATE)**(VIE-1)
   ) ));XXI
EQOBJ(SS)..
  TOTALCOST =E= CONTROL(SS) + EMISCOST(SS);
EQTECH1(J,SS)..
  SUM(I, X(J,I,SS)) =E= 1;
EQTECH2(SS)..
  X(’IeM’,’0’,SS) + X(’IeM’,’1’,SS)
  + X(’CAR’,’4’,SS) + X(’CAR’,’5’,SS) + X(’CAR’,’6’,SS) =E= 1;
EQTECH2b(SS)..
  X(’IeM’,’2’,SS)
  + X(’CAR’,’0’,SS) + X(’CAR’,’1’,SS) + X(’CAR’,’2’,SS) + X(’CAR’,’3’,SS) =E= 1;
￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
MODEL CARPROD         production block with annual emission tax TAXEM
   / EQCOST, EQEMISS, EQEMISPOL, EQTECH1, EQTECH2, EQTECH2b, EQOBJ /;
MODEL CARTAX          production block with purchase tax or incentive PTAX
   / EQCOST, EQEMISCT, EQEMISPOLL, EQTECH1, EQOBJ /;
MODEL CARCIRCUL       production block with annual tax on emission TAXEMF
   / EQCOST, EQEMISCIRC, EQEMISPOL, EQTECH1, EQTECH2, EQTECH2b, EQOBJ /;
MODEL CARPRODTAX      production block with emission tax TAXEM and purchase tax or
incentive PTAX
   / EQCOST, EQEMISS, EQEMISCT, EQEMISPOL, EQEMISPOLL, EQTECH1, EQTECH2, EQTECH2b,
     EQOBJ /;
￿                                                                      
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿￿￿)￿8￿(￿/￿7￿$￿;
￿                                                                      
*** Fuel technology model
*** Choice of a fuel package (gasoline + diesel)
￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
FREE VARIABLE
TOTALC              total cost to be minimised                       1 000 000 ECU;
POSITIVE VARIABLES
XX(II)              choice of fuels package II
CONTROLC            control costs                                    1 000 000 ECU
EMISC               emissions costs                                  1 000 000 ECU
EMISPOLC(S,G,POLL)  total emissions over 5 year of a S G car         0.1 g pol p car
;
￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQUATIONS
EQCONTROL                 control costs
EQEMISPOLC(S,G,POLL)      emission costs per car and pollutant for 5 years
(4(0,632/)￿6￿*￿32//￿￿￿￿￿￿￿HPLVVLRQ￿FRVWV￿SHU￿FDU￿DQG￿SROOXWDQW￿IRU￿￿￿\HDUV
EQEMISC                   total emission costs
(4(0,6)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿WRWDO￿HPLVVLRQ￿FRVWV
EQOBJF              total cost to minimise
*** Technical constraint
EQTECH              sum of XXii must equal 1
;
￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQCONTROL..
  CONTROLC =E= SUM(II, XX(II) * CC(II));
EQEMISPOLC(S,G,POLL)..
  EMISPOLC(S,G,POLL) =E= 1000000*KMSG(S,G) * AVGEMISF(S,G,POLL)
                        * SUM(II, XX(II)*(1-FRED(II,S,POLL)));
(4(0,632/)￿6￿*￿32//￿￿￿
￿￿(0,632/&￿6￿*￿32//￿￿ ( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿680￿/￿680￿3.￿￿.06*/3.￿6￿*￿/￿3.￿￿￿￿)()))￿6￿*￿/￿3.￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿680￿,,￿￿;;￿,,￿￿￿￿￿)5(’￿,,￿6￿32//￿￿￿￿
EQEMISC..
  EMISC =E= SUM(S,SUM(G,SUM(POLL, NC(S,G) * EMISPOLC(S,G,POLL) * TAXEM(POLL) )))
      -SUM(G,SUM(POLL, NC(’LPG’,G) * EMISPOLC(’LPG’,G,POLL) * TAXEM(POLL) ))
      +SUM(P,SUM(G, TAXEM(’VOC’)*EVAPOGF(P,G)*SUM(II, XX(II)*(1-FREDEVAP(II)) ) ))*10;
(4(0,6)￿￿
￿￿(0,6&￿ ( ￿680￿6￿￿&255￿6￿￿￿680￿*￿680￿32//￿￿1&￿6￿*￿￿(0,632/&￿6￿*￿32//￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7$;)8(/￿32//￿6￿￿￿￿￿79$)8(/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿￿￿XXII
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿680￿*￿680￿32//￿￿1&￿￿/3*￿￿*￿￿(0,632/&￿￿/3*￿￿*￿32//￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7$;)8(/￿32//￿￿/3*￿￿￿￿￿￿79$)8(/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/3*￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿680￿3￿680￿*￿￿7$;)8(/￿￿92&￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿79$)8(/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿680￿,,￿￿;;￿,,￿￿￿￿￿)5(’(9$3￿,,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
EQTECH..
  SUM(II, XX(II)) =E= 1;
EQOBJF..
  TOTALC =E= CONTROLC + EMISC;
￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿￿￿G￿H￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
MODEL FUELCHOICE                    fuel block
  / EQCONTROL, EQEMISPOLC, EQEMISC, EQTECH, EQOBJF /;
MODEL FUELTAX                       fuel block
  / EQCONTROL, EQEMISPOLF, EQEMISF, EQTECH, EQOBJF /;
￿                                                                      
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿￿￿7￿5￿$￿1￿6￿3￿2￿5￿7
￿                                                                      
FREE VARIABLE
DUMMY               dummy var for optimisation        model TRANSPORT
￿                                 
￿    ￿’D￿￿3ULFH￿PRGXOH￿￿￿￿￿      
￿                                 
￿￿￿￿’D￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
*** The variables below do not generally represent real prices, but aggregated prices,
***  most often geometric averages of the prices in the inferior nests.
*** ’Real’ prices are PCTSGATN: generalised price per km, and
***  PCTSGAownership: total fixed costs of owning a car.
*** PCPU is arbitrarily fixed since PUblic transport volume is only measured
***  by an index.
POSITIVE VARIABLES
PCTSGATN(V,S,G,TT,L,PK)   generalised price by S G motive and network  ECU per 10 km
PCTSGATL(V,S,G,TT,L)      value by S G motive and location
PCTSGAT(V,S,G,TT)         value by size generation and trip type
PCTSGA(V,S,G,A)           value by size generation and aspect          10 000 ECU
PCTSGC(V,S,G,C)           value by size generation and characteristic  10 000 ECU
PCTSG(V,S,G)              value by size and generation
PCTS(V,S)                 value by size
PCPU(V)                   value public transport services
PCPR(V)                   value private vehicle services
PCTR(V)                   value total transport services
TIMEPU(V)           public transportation traveltime              hour per 100 km
TIME(V,S,L,PK)      travel time by S of car and depending on N    hour per 100 km
;
￿￿￿￿’D￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQUATIONS
EQ9PRICE(V,S,G,TT,L)
EQ8PRICE(V,S,G,TT)
EQ7PRICE(V,S,G)
EQ6APRICE(V,S,G)
EQ6BPRICE(V,S,G)
EQ5PRICE(V,S,G)
EQ4PRICE(V,S)
EQ3PRICE(V)
EQ2PRICE(V)
EQ2BPRICE(V)
;
￿￿￿￿’D￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
*** The following equations aggregate prices of the inferior nest into
***  a composite value used in the superior nest.
EQ9PRICE(T,S,G,TT,L)..
  PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L) =E=
  SUM(PK, A9(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)*PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)**(1-S9(S,G,TT,L)))XXIII
              ** (1/(1-S9(S,G,TT,L)));
EQ8PRICE(T,S,G,TT)..
  PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT) =E=
  SUM(L, A8(T,S,G,TT,L)*PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L)**(1-S8(S,G,TT)))  **  (1/(1-S8(S,G,TT)));
EQ7PRICE(T,S,G)..
  PCTSGA(T,S,G,’USAGE’) =E=
  SUM(TT, A7(T,S,G,TT)*PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT)**(1-S7(S,G)))  **  (1/(1-S7(S,G)));
EQ6APRICE(T,S,G)..
  PCTSGC(T,S,G,’SUPPL’) =E= PCTSGA(T,S,G,’USAGE’);
EQ6BPRICE(T,S,G)..
  PCTSGC(T,S,G,’COM’) =E= PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’)
                         + MINKM(S,G)*PCTSGC(T,S,G,’SUPPL’);
EQ5PRICE(T,S,G)..
  PCTSG(T,S,G) =E= PROD(C, PCTSGC(T,S,G,C)**W5(T,S,G,C));
EQ4PRICE(T,S)..
  PCTS(T,S) =E= SUM(G, A4(’1985’,S,G)*PCTSG(T,S,G)**(1-S4(S)))  **  (1/(1-S4(S)));
EQ3PRICE(T)..
  PCPR(T) =E= SUM(S,A3(S)*PCTS(T,S)**(1-S3))  **  (1/(1-S3));
EQ2PRICE(T)..
  PCTR(T) =E= (  A2PU*PCPU(T)**(1-S2) + A2PR*PCPR(T)**(1-S2) )  **  (1/(1-S2));
EQ2BPRICE(T)..
  PCPU(T) =E= XPCPU(T) + TIMEPU(T)*VAOT(T,’PUBLICTRP’);
￿                                 
￿   ￿’E￿￿&RQVXPSWLRQ￿PRGXOH￿     
￿                                 
￿￿￿￿’E￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
*** As for the prices, the demand variables do not generally represent real
***  quantities.
*** ’Real’ volumes are VCTSGATN: kmage per age and type of car, and also per
***  trip type, and motive, and
*** VCTSGAownership: number of cars per type and age.
POSITIVE VARIABLES
VCTSGATN(V,S,G,TT,L,PK)   volume by size generation motive and network    100 Mrd km
VCTSGATL(V,S,G,TT,L)      volume by size generation motive and location
VCTSGAT(V,S,G,TT)   volume by size generation and trip type
VCTSGA(V,S,G,A)     volume by size generation and aspect                  Mio cars
VCTSGC(V,S,G,C)     volume by size generation and characteristic          Mio cars
VCTSG(V,S,G)        volume by size and generation
VCTS(V,S)           volume by size
VCPU(V)             volume of public transport services
VCPR(V)             volume of private transport services
VCRC(V)             volume of non-transport goods and services
VCTR(V)             volume of total transport services
BUDG8(V,S,G,TT,L)   budget by size generation motive and location
BUDG7(V,S,G,TT)     budget by size generation and motive
BUDG6(V,S,G,A)      budget by size generation and aspect
BUDG5(V,S,G,C)      budget by size generation and characteristic
BUDG4(V,S,G)        budget by size and generation
BUDG3(V,S)          budget by size
BUDG2(V)            budget private transport services
BUDG1(V)            budget total transport services
;
PARAMETER
BVCTSGA(V,S,G,A)    baseline volume by size generation and aspect         Mio cars
;
￿￿￿￿’E￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQUATIONS
EQDEM9(V,S,G,TT,L,PK)     mileage demand by size generation motive and network
EQBUDG8(V,S,G,TT,L)       budget by size generation motive and location
EQDEM8(V,S,G,TT,L)  CES demand by size generation and location
EQBUDG7(V,S,G,TT)   budget by size generation and motive
EQDEM7(V,S,G,TT)    CES demand by size generation and motive
EQBUDG6(V,S,G,A)    budget by size generation and aspect
EQDEM6A(V,S,G)      ownership demand by size and generation
EQDEM6B(V,S,G)      usage demand by size and generation
EQBUDG5(V,S,G,C)    budget by size generation and characteristic
EQDEM5(V,S,G,C)     LES demand by size generation and aspect
EQBUDG4(V,S,G)      budget by size and generationXXIV
EQDEM4(V,S,G)       CES demand by size and generation
EQBUDG3(V,S)        budget by size
EQDEM3(V,S)         CES demand by size
EQBUDG2(V)          budget private transport services
EQDEM2PU(V)         CES demand public transport services
EQDEM2PR(V)         CES demand private transport services
EQBUDG1(V)          budget total transport services
EQDEM1RC(V)         CES demand non-transport goods and services
EQDEM1TR(V)         CES demand total transport services
*highest level
EQDUMMY             dummy equation for optimisation
;
￿￿￿￿’E￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
*ninth level
EQDEM9(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)$(PCTSGATNZ(S,G,TT,L,PK) $A9(T,S,G,TT,L,PK))..
  VCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK) =E= BUDG8(T,S,G,TT,L) /
  ( PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)*
   (  (PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)/PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,’PEAK’))**(S9(S,G,TT,L)-1)
       * A9(T,S,G,TT,L,’PEAK’)/A9(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)
    + (PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)/PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,’OFFPK’))**(S9(S,G,TT,L)-1)
       * A9(T,S,G,TT,L,’OFFPK’)/A9(T,S,G,TT,L,PK) )      ) ;
EQBUDG8(T,S,G,TT,L)..
  BUDG8(T,S,G,TT,L) =E= VCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L)*PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L);
*eight level
EQDEM8(T,S,G,TT,L)$(PCTSGATLZ(S,G,TT,L) $A8(T,S,G,TT,L))..
  VCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L) =E= BUDG7(T,S,G,TT) /
  ( PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L)*
   (  (PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L)/PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,’URBAN’))**(S8(S,G,TT)-1)
       * A8(T,S,G,TT,’URBAN’)/A8(T,S,G,TT,L)
    + (PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L)/PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,’RURAL’))**(S8(S,G,TT)-1)
       * A8(T,S,G,TT,’RURAL’)/A8(T,S,G,TT,L)
    + (PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,L)/PCTSGATL(T,S,G,TT,’HIGHWAY’))**(S8(S,G,TT)-1)
       * A8(T,S,G,TT,’HIGHWAY’)/A8(T,S,G,TT,L)  )      ) ;
EQBUDG7(T,S,G,TT)..
  BUDG7(T,S,G,TT) =E= VCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT)*PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT);
*seventh level
EQDEM7(T,S,G,TT)$(PCTSGATZ(S,G,TT) $A7(T,S,G,TT))..
  VCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT) =E= BUDG6(T,S,G,’USAGE’) /
  ( PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT)*
   (  (PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT)/PCTSGAT(T,S,G,’COMMUTING’))**(S7(S,G)-1)
       * A7(T,S,G,’COMMUTING’)/A7(T,S,G,TT)
    + (PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT)/PCTSGAT(T,S,G,’PRIVATE’))**(S7(S,G)-1)
       * A7(T,S,G,’PRIVATE’)/A7(T,S,G,TT)
    + (PCTSGAT(T,S,G,TT)/PCTSGAT(T,S,G,’PROF’))**(S7(S,G)-1)
       * A7(T,S,G,’PROF’)/A7(T,S,G,TT)  )      ) ;
EQBUDG6(T,S,G,A)..
  BUDG6(T,S,G,A) =E= VCTSGA(T,S,G,A)*PCTSGA(T,S,G,A);
*sixth level
EQDEM6A(T,S,G)$W5(T,S,G,’COM’)..
  VCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) =E= BUDG5(T,S,G,’COM’) /
    ( PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) + MINKM(S,G)*PCTSGA(T,S,G,’USAGE’) );
EQDEM6B(T,S,G)$W5(T,S,G,’SUPPL’)..
  VCTSGA(T,S,G,’USAGE’) =E= VCTSGC(T,S,G,’SUPPL’)
     + ( BUDG5(T,S,G,’COM’) - PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’)*VCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) )
       / PCTSGA(T,S,G,’USAGE’) ;
EQBUDG5(T,S,G,C)..
  BUDG5(T,S,G,C) =E= PCTSGC(T,S,G,C)*VCTSGC(T,S,G,C) ;
*fifth level
EQDEM5(T,S,G,C)$W5(T,S,G,C)..
  VCTSGC(T,S,G,C) =E= B5(T,S,G,C)
 + ( A5(T,S,G,C)* ( BUDG4(T,S,G) - B5(T,S,G,’COM’)*PCTSGC(T,S,G,’COM’)
                                 - B5(T,S,G,’SUPPL’)*PCTSGC(T,S,G,’SUPPL’) ) )
   /PCTSGC(T,S,G,C);
EQBUDG4(T,S,G)..
  BUDG4(T,S,G) =E= VCTSG(T,S,G)*PCTSG(T,S,G);
*fourth level
EQDEM4(T,S,G)$PCTSGAZ(S,G,’OWNERSHIP’)..
  VCTSG(T,S,G) =E= BUDG3(T,S)  /  (  PCTSG(T,S,G)*
(  (PCTSG(T,S,G)/PCTSG(T,S,’NEW’))**(S4(S)-1)*A4(T,S,’NEW’)/A4(T,S,G)
 + (PCTSG(T,S,G)/PCTSG(T,S,’MOINS1’))**(S4(S)-1)*A4(T,S,’MOINS1’)/A4(T,S,G)
 + (PCTSG(T,S,G)/PCTSG(T,S,’MOINS2’))**(S4(S)-1)*A4(T,S,’MOINS2’)/A4(T,S,G)
 + (PCTSG(T,S,G)/PCTSG(T,S,’MOINS3’))**(S4(S)-1)*A4(T,S,’MOINS3’)/A4(T,S,G)
 + (PCTSG(T,S,G)/PCTSG(T,S,’MOINS4’))**(S4(S)-1)*A4(T,S,’MOINS4’)/A4(T,S,G)
 )                                ) ;
EQBUDG3(T,S)..XXV
  BUDG3(T,S) =E= VCTS(T,S)*PCTS(T,S);
*third level
EQDEM3(T,S)..
  VCTS(T,S) =E= BUDG2(T)  /  ( PCTS(T,S)*
(  (PCTS(T,S)/PCTS(T,’SMALL’))**(S3-1)* A3(’SMALL’)/A3(S)
 + (PCTS(T,S)/PCTS(T,’MEDIUM’))**(S3-1)* A3(’MEDIUM’)/A3(S)
 + (PCTS(T,S)/PCTS(T,’LARGE’))**(S3-1)* A3(’LARGE’)/A3(S)
 + (PCTS(T,S)/PCTS(T,’DIESEL’))**(S3-1)* A3(’DIESEL’)/A3(S)
 + (PCTS(T,S)/PCTS(T,’LPG’))**(S3-1)*A3(’LPG’)/A3(S) )  );
EQBUDG2(T)..
  BUDG2(T) =E= VCPR(T)*PCPR(T);
*second level
EQDEM2PU(T)..         VCPU(T) =E= BUDG1(T) /
  ( PCPU(T) * (1 + (PCPU(T)/PCPR(T))**(S2-1) * (A2PR/A2PU)) );
EQDEM2PR(T)..         VCPR(T) =E= BUDG1(T) /
  ( PCPR(T) * ( (PCPR(T)/PCPU(T))**(S2-1) * (A2PU/A2PR) + 1 ) );
EQBUDG1(T)..          BUDG1(T) =E= VCTR(T)*PCTR(T);
*first level
EQDEM1RC(T)..         VCRC(T) =E= BUDG0(T) /
  ( PCRC(T) * (1 + (PCRC(T)/PCTR(T))**(S1-1) * (A1TR/A1RC)) );
EQDEM1TR(T)..         VCTR(T) =E= BUDG0(T) /
  ( PCTR(T) * ( (PCTR(T)/PCRC(T))**(S1-1) * (A1RC/A1TR) + 1 ) );
*highest level
EQDUMMY..             DUMMY =E= 1 ;
￿                                 
￿    ￿’F￿￿&DU￿PDUNHW￿￿￿￿￿        
￿                                 
￿￿￿￿’F￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
POSITIVE VARIABLES
FEFF(V,S,G,L,PK)    total on road fuel use by S G and N   l per 10 km
*old cars
OCMP(V,S,O)         second-hand car prices                10 000 ECU
ESCRAP(V,S,O)       endogenous scrappage                  Mio cars
*new cars
NCPC(V,S)           consumer new car prices (after tax)   10 000 ECU
*all cars
DEPR(V,S,G)         depreciation of vehicle               10 000 ECU
CAPC(V,S,G)         capital costs of vehicle ownership    10 000 ECU
;
￿￿￿￿’F￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
*** For some equations, some variants exist, depending on the tax
***  incentive scheme, or the technological regulation in force.
EQUATIONS
*old cars
EQDEPRO(V,S,Q)      depreciation of old cars (more than 10 y of age)
EQDEPROB(V,S)       depreciation of old cars (5 to 10 y old)
EQCAPCO(V,S,Q)      capacity costs old cars (more than 10 y of age)
EQCAPCOB(V,S)       capacity costs old cars (5 to 10 y old)
EQSCRAP(V,S,O)      scrappage
 EQSCRAPM(V,S,O)     scrappage  with additional scrappage due to IeM
EQVOLD(V,S,O)       volume of old cars  remaining after scrappage
*new cars
EQDEPRN(V,S)        depreciation of new cars
EQCAPCN(V,S)        capacity costs new cars
EQNCPC(V,S)         consumer new car prices
 EQNCPCT(V,S)        consumer price of a new car  with PTAX
*all cars (without TAXEM)
EQPVAR(V,S,G,TT,L,PK)     variable price of vehicle services (usage)
EQPFIX(V,S,G)             fixed price of vehicle services (ownership)
*all cars (with policies controlling conv. emissions)
EQPVARM(V,S,G,TT,L,PK)    variable price of vehicle services  with TAXEM
EQPVARF(V,S,G,TT,L,PK)    variable price of vehicle services  with TAXFUEL
EQPFIXM(V,S,G)      fixed price of vehicle services  with TAXEM
EQPFIXC(V,S,G)      fixed price of vehicle services  with TAXEMF
EQPFIXS(V,S,G)      fixed price of vehicle services + add costs of IeM scheme
;XXVI
￿￿￿￿’F￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
*old cars
EQDEPRO(T,S,Q)..      DEPR(T,S,Q) =E= 5* (OCMP(T,S,Q)/5);
EQDEPROB(T,S)..       DEPR(T,S,’MOINS1’) =E= 5* (OCMP(T,S,’MOINS1’)/6);
EQCAPCO(T,S,Q)..      CAPC(T,S,Q) =E= INT(T)*3*OCMP(T,S,Q);
EQCAPCOB(T,S)..
  CAPC(T,S,’MOINS1’) =E= INT(T)*20/6*OCMP(T,S,’MOINS1’);
EQSCRAP(T,S,O)$RCSIGMA(S,O)..
  ESCRAP(T,S,O) =E= ( ( 1-ERRORF( (OCMP(T,S,O)-RCMU(S,O))/RCSIGMA(S,O) ) )
                     + EXSCRAP(S,O) )  * ( VINT(T,S,O)-CSCRAP(T,S,O) );
 EQSCRAPM(T,S,O)$RCSIGMA(S,O)..
  ESCRAP(T,S,O) =E= ( ( 1-ERRORF( (OCMP(T,S,O)-RCMU(S,O))/RCSIGMA(S,O) ) )
                   + EXSCRAP(S,O) )  * ( VINT(T,S,O)-CSCRAP(T,S,O) )
                 + SUM( I, X.L(’IeM’,I,S) * ADDSCRAP(I) ) * VCTSGA(T,S,O,’OWNERSHIP’);
EQVOLD(T,S,O)..
  VCTSGC(T,S,O,’COM’) =E= VINT(T,S,O) - CSCRAP(T,S,O) - ESCRAP(T,S,O);
*new cars
EQDEPRN(T,S)..        DEPR(T,S,’NEW’) =E= 0.6 * NCPC(T,S);
EQCAPCN(T,S)..
  CAPC(T,S,’NEW’) =E=  INT(T)*3.8*NCPC(T,S)
                     + (  0.4*NCPC(T,S) - ( OCMP(T,S,’MOINS1’)*(1+KTI(T,S)) )  );
EQNCPC(T,S)..
  NCPC(T,S) =E= (1 + OCP(T,S) + TVACAR(T,S))
               *( NCPP(T,S) + TAX(T,S)*(FEFFTECH(T,S) - TFEFF(T,S)) );
 EQNCPCT(T,S).. NCPC(T,S) =E= (1 + OCP(T,S) + TVACAR(T,S))
  *( NCPP(T,S) + TAX(T,S)*(FEFFTECH(T,S) - TFEFF(T,S))
    +SUM(POLL, PTAX(POLL)*( BAVGEMSG(T,S,’NEW’,POLL)/1000*KFV(T,S,’NEW’,POLL)
                            -TARGETEXH(POLL) ) ) );
*all cars  (without TAXEM)
EQPVAR(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)$N(L,PK)..
  PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)  =E= VCE(T,S,G) + TIME(T,S,L,PK)*VAOT(T,TT)
                    + FEFF(T,S,G,L,PK) * (PFUEL(T,S)+VCP(T,S))*(1+TVAFUEL(T,S));
EQPFIX(T,S,G)..
  PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) =E= FCE(T,S,G) + FCP(T,S) + DEPR(T,S,G) + CAPC(T,S,G);
*all cars  (with policies controlling conv. pollution)
EQPVARM(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)$N(L,PK)..  PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)  =E=
  VCE(T,S,G) + FEFF(T,S,G,L,PK) * (PFUEL(T,S)+VCP(T,S))*(1+TVAFUEL(T,S))
  + 100*SUM( POLL, TAXEM(POLL)* BAVGEMSG(T,S,G,POLL) * KFV(T,S,G,POLL)
                                                     * KDEGRA(T,S,G,POLL)
                                                     * (1-FREDV(T,S,POLL)) )
  + TIME(T,S,L,PK)*VAOT(T,TT);
EQPVARF(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)$N(L,PK)..  PCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK)  =E=
  VCE(T,S,G) + FEFF(T,S,G,L,PK) * ( (PFUEL(T,S)+VCP(T,S))*(1+TVAFUEL(T,S))
  + SUM(POLL, TAXFUEL(POLL,S) * (1-FREDV(T,S,POLL))) )
  + TIME(T,S,L,PK)*VAOT(T,TT);
EQPFIXM(T,S,G)..     PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) =E=
  FCE(T,S,G) + FCP(T,S) + DEPR(T,S,G) + CAPC(T,S,G)
  + SUM(I, X.L(’IeM’,I,S) *LIFECOST(’IeM’,I)*MAX(INDIC3(G),INDICIM(I)))
  + TAXEM(’VOC’)/1000 *EVAPOG(T,S,G)/BVCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’)
                      *(1-REDV(T,S,G))
                      *(1-FREDEVAPV(T));
EQPFIXC(T,S,G)..     PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) =E=
  FCE(T,S,G) + FCP(T,S) + DEPR(T,S,G) + CAPC(T,S,G)
  + SUM(I, X.L(’IeM’,I,S) *LIFECOST(’IeM’,I)*MAX(INDIC3(G),INDICIM(I)))
  + SUM(POLL, TAXEMF(POLL)/1000 * BAVGEMSG(T,S,G,POLL)
                                * KFV(T,S,G,POLL) * KDEGRA(T,S,G,POLL) );
EQPFIXS(T,S,G)..     PCTSGA(T,S,G,’OWNERSHIP’) =E=
  FCE(T,S,G) + FCP(T,S) + DEPR(T,S,G) + CAPC(T,S,G)
  + SUM(I, X.L(’IeM’,I,S) *LIFECOST(’IeM’,I)*MAX(INDIC3(G),INDICIM(I)) );
￿                                 
￿    ￿’G￿￿6SHHG￿FXUYHV￿￿￿        
￿                                 
￿￿￿￿’G￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
POSITIVE VARIABLES
AVGTIME(V,L,PK)     average travel time by network                hour per 100 km
CAPUT(V,L,PK)       index of infrastructure utilisation
;
￿￿￿￿’G￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQUATIONS
EQCAPUT(V,L,PK)     index of infrastructure utilisationXXVII
EQTTIME(V,L,PK)     average travel time on the network
EQTTIMES(V,S,L,PK)  travel time by network and size of the car
EQTIMEPU(V)         travel time using public transport
;
￿￿￿￿’G￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQCAPUT(T,L,PK)$N(L,PK)..
  CAPUT(T,L,PK) =E=  BETA(L,PK)* SUM(S, SUM(G, SUM(TT, VCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK))))
                                  / INFRA(T,L,PK);
EQTTIME(T,L,PK)$N(L,PK)..
  AVGTIME(T,L,PK) =E= 100* ( ZZ(L,PK)*EXP(CAPUT(T,L,PK)) + ALPH(L,PK) );
EQTTIMES(T,S,L,PK)$N(L,PK)..
  TIME(T,S,L,PK) =E= TIMES(S,L,PK) * AVGTIME(T,L,PK);
EQTIMEPU(T)..
  TIMEPU(T) =E= (1-VARTIMEPU) * TIMEFIXPU
         + VARTIMEPU * RATIO * SUM(L, SUM(PK$N(L,PK), SHAREPU(L,PK)*AVGTIME(T,L,PK)));
￿                                 
￿  ￿’H￿￿)XHO￿XVH￿UHODWLRQVKLSV￿  
￿                                 
*** Real on road fuel use, as modelled by CORINAIR-Copert relationships
***  i.e. formulae linking fuel consumption to the speed
*** NB: The same formulae are used in FOREMOVE
￿￿￿￿’H￿￿￿￿￿9￿D￿U￿L￿D￿E￿O￿H￿V
POSITIVE VARIABLES
FEFFTP(V,S,TEC,L,PK)   on road fuel use by S TEC and N  no cold start   l per 10 km
FEFFCOLD(V,S,TEC)      extra cold start fuel consumption                l per 10 km
FEFFT(V,S,TEC,L,PK)    total on road fuel use by S TEC and N            l per 10 km
;
￿￿￿￿’H￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿F￿O￿D￿U￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q
*** The following equations correspond to the different functional forms used to
***  express the speed-fuel consumption relation.
EQUATIONS
EQFEFF1(V,S,TEC,L,PK)     CORINAIR relationship   quadratic form
EQFEFF1B(V,S,TEC,L,PK)    CORINAIR relationship   for small ece1504 cars urban cdtns
*** if speed inf to 25 kmph *** EQFEFF2(V,S,TEC,L,PK)      CORINAIR relationship
EQFEFF3(V,S,TEC,L,PK)     CORINAIR relationship   expo type
EQFEFF4(V,S,TEC,L,PK)     CORINAIR relationship   for preece cars rural cdtns
EQFEFF5(V,S,TEC,L,PK)     CORINAIR relationship   for diesel cars
EQFEFF6(V,TEC,PK)         CORINAIR relationship   for lpg cars   urban cdtns
EQFEFF7(V,TEC,PK)         CORINAIR relationship   for lpg cars   rural cdtns
EQFEFF8(V,TEC,PK)         CORINAIR relationship   for lpg cars   highway cdtns
*** Extra cold start consumption is a fraction of normal consumption added to
***  consumption in urban cdtns. The size of extra cold start consumption depends
***  on the technology stage.
EQFEFFCOLD(V,S,TEC)       cold start relationship
EQFEF1(V,S,TEC,PK)        total consumption incl cold start ’urban’
EQFEF2(V,S,TEC,PK)        total consumption incl cold start ’rural’
EQFEF3(V,S,TEC,PK)        total consumption incl cold start ’hgw’
*** CORINAIR-Copert formulas are given by car technology type (TEC).
*** Conversion is needed to have average consumption by vintage (G).
EQFEFFC1(V,S,G,L,PK)      conversion FEFFT by TEC to FEFF by G
EQFEFFC2(V,S,TEC,G,L,PK)  conversion FEFFT by TEC to FEFF by G new technologies
;
￿￿￿￿’H￿￿￿￿￿(￿T￿X￿D￿W￿L￿R￿Q￿V￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
EQFEFF1(T,P,TEC,L,PK)
 $(N(L,PK)$(SIZETEC(P,TEC)$(INDIC(TEC,L)$(COEFF(’AA’,P,TEC)))))..
  FEFFTP(T,P,TEC,L,PK) =E=
  1/80 * (  COEFF(’AA’,P,TEC) + COEFF(’BB’,P,TEC)*(100/TIME(T,P,L,PK))
                              + COEFF(’CC’,P,TEC)*((100/TIME(T,P,L,PK))**2) );
EQFEFF1B(T,’SMALL’,’ECE1504’,’URBAN’,PK)..XXVIII
  FEFFTP (T,’SMALL’,’ECE1504’,’URBAN’,PK) =E=
  1/80 * (  COEFF(’AA’,’SMALL’,’ECE1504’)
          + COEFF(’BB’,’SMALL’,’ECE1504’)*(100/TIME(T,’SMALL’,’URBAN’,PK))
          + COEFF(’CC’,’SMALL’,’ECE1504’)*(100/TIME(T,’SMALL’,’URBAN’,PK)**2));
*** EQFEFF2(T,V,TEC,L,PK)
*** $(N(L,PK)$(100/TIME(T,P,L,PK)) LT TCOEFF(P,TEC)$COEFF(’DD’,P,TEC)))..
***  FEFFTP (T,P,TEC,L,PK) =E=
*** 1/80 * ( COEFF(’EE’,P,TEC) - COEFF(’DD’,P,TEC)*LOG( 100/TIME(T,P,L,PK) ) );
EQFEFF3(T,P,TEC,’URBAN’,PK)
 $(COEFF(’FF’,P,TEC)$(SIZETEC(P,TEC)$(INDIC(TEC,’URBAN’) NE 1)))..
  FEFFTP (T,P,TEC,’URBAN’,PK) =E=
  1/80 * (COEFF(’EE’,P,TEC) * (100/TIME(T,P,’URBAN’,PK))**COEFF(’FF’,P,TEC));
EQFEFF4(T,P,’PREECE’,’RURAL’,PK)$(N(’RURAL’,PK)$(SIZETEC(P,’PREECE’)))..
  FEFFTP (T,P,’PREECE’,’RURAL’,PK) =E= 1/80 * COEFF(’AA’,P,’PREECE’);
EQFEFF5(T,’DIESEL’,TEC,L,PK)
 $(N(L,PK)$(SIZETEC(’DIESEL’,TEC)$(COEFF(’AA’,’DIESEL’,TEC))))..
  FEFFTP (T,’DIESEL’,TEC,L,PK) =E=
  1/90 * (  COEFF(’AA’,’DIESEL’,TEC)
          + COEFF(’BB’,’DIESEL’,TEC)*(100/TIME(T,’DIESEL’,L,PK))
          + COEFF(’CC’,’DIESEL’,TEC)*((100/TIME(T,’DIESEL’,L,PK))**2) );
EQFEFF6(T,TEC,PK)$(N(’URBAN’,PK)$(SIZETEC(’LPG’,TEC)$(COEFF(’AA’,’LPG’,TEC))))..
  FEFFTP (T,’LPG’,TEC,’URBAN’,PK) =E= 1/50 * COEFF(’AA’,’LPG’,TEC);
EQFEFF7(T,TEC,PK)$(N(’RURAL’,PK)$(SIZETEC(’LPG’,TEC)$(COEFF(’BB’,’LPG’,TEC))))..
  FEFFTP (T,’LPG’,TEC,’RURAL’,PK) =E= 1/50 * COEFF(’BB’,’LPG’,TEC);
EQFEFF8(T,TEC,PK)$(N(’HIGHWAY’,PK)$(SIZETEC(’LPG’,TEC)$(COEFF(’CC’,’LPG’,TEC))))..
  FEFFTP (T,’LPG’,TEC,’HIGHWAY’,PK) =E= 1/50 * COEFF(’CC’,’LPG’,TEC);
EQFEFFCOLD(T,S,TEC)
 $( SUM(G, TECVINT(T,S,G,TEC)) NE 0)..
  FEFFCOLD(T,S,TEC) =E= BETACOLD
  *SUM(L,SUM(PK$N(L,PK), FEFFTP(T,S,TEC,L,PK) * SHARENETZ(S,L,PK)/100 ))
  *(RATIOCOLDF(S,TEC) - 1)
  *SUM(G, TECVINT(T,S,G,TEC)*SUM(TT,SUM(L,SUM(PK$N(L,PK), VCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,L,PK) ))))
  /SUM(G, TECVINT(T,S,G,TEC)*SUM(TT,SUM(PK, VCTSGATN(T,S,G,TT,’URBAN’,PK) )) );
EQFEF1(T,S,TEC,PK)$(N(’URBAN’,PK)$SUM(G,TECVINT(T,S,G,TEC)))..
  FEFFT(T,S,TEC,’URBAN’,PK) =E= FEFFTP(T,S,TEC,’URBAN’,PK) + FEFFCOLD(T,S,TEC);
EQFEF2(T,S,TEC,PK)$(N(’RURAL’,PK)$(SUM(G,TECVINT(T,S,G,TEC))))..
  FEFFT(T,S,TEC,’RURAL’,PK) =E= FEFFTP(T,S,TEC,’RURAL’,PK);
EQFEF3(T,S,TEC,PK)$(N(’HIGHWAY’,PK)$(SUM(G,TECVINT(T,S,G,TEC))))..
  FEFFT(T,S,TEC,’HIGHWAY’,PK) =E= FEFFTP(T,S,TEC,’HIGHWAY’,PK);
EQFEFFC1(T,S,G,L,PK)$(N(L,PK)$(INDIC2(G)))..
  FEFF(T,S,G,L,PK) =E= SUM(TEC$(SIZETEC(S,TEC)$(VINTTEC(T,S,TEC,G))),
                           VINTTEC(T,S,TEC,G) * VCTSTAZ(S,TEC,’USAGE’)
                           * FEFFT(T,S,TEC,L,PK) * SHARENETZ(S,L,PK)/100)
                      / VCTSGANZ(T,S,G,L,PK);
EQFEFFC2(T,S,TEC,G,L,PK)$(N(L,PK)$VINTTEC2(T,S,TEC,G))..
  FEFF(T,S,G,L,PK) =E=  FEFFT(T,S,TEC,L,PK);
￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿0￿R￿G￿H￿O￿￿￿G￿H￿￿I￿L￿Q￿L￿W￿L￿R￿Q
MODEL TRANSPORT     transport block without specific policies to control conv. emis.
*** price module
 /EQ9PRICE, EQ8PRICE, EQ7PRICE, EQ6APRICE, EQ6BPRICE, EQ5PRICE, EQ4PRICE, EQ3PRICE,
  EQ2PRICE, EQ2BPRICE,
*** consumption module
  EQDEM9, EQBUDG8, EQDEM8, EQBUDG7, EQDEM7, EQBUDG6, EQDEM6A, EQDEM6B, EQBUDG5,
  EQDEM5, EQBUDG4, EQDEM4, EQBUDG3, EQDEM3, EQBUDG2, EQDEM2PU, EQDEM2PR, EQBUDG1,
  EQDEM1RC, EQDEM1TR, EQDUMMY,
*** car market
  EQDEPRO, EQDEPROB, EQCAPCO, EQCAPCOB, EQSCRAP, EQVOLD, EQDEPRN, EQCAPCN, EQNCPC,
  EQPVAR, EQPFIX,
*** speed curves
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
*** fuel consumption
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
 /;
*** Other variants exist
  EQPVARM, EQPFIXM,
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
/;
MODEL TRANSPORTs    transport block with IeM scheme
 /EQ9PRICE, EQ8PRICE, EQ7PRICE, EQ6APRICE, EQ6BPRICE, EQ5PRICE, EQ4PRICE, EQ3PRICE,XXIX
  EQ2PRICE, EQ2BPRICE,
  EQDEM9, EQBUDG8, EQDEM8, EQBUDG7, EQDEM7, EQBUDG6, EQDEM6A, EQDEM6B, EQBUDG5,
  EQDEM5, EQBUDG4, EQDEM4, EQBUDG3, EQDEM3, EQBUDG2, EQDEM2PU, EQDEM2PR, EQBUDG1,
  EQDEM1RC, EQDEM1TR, EQDUMMY,
  EQDEPRO, EQDEPROB, EQCAPCO, EQCAPCOB, EQSCRAPM, EQVOLD, EQDEPRN, EQCAPCN, EQNCPC,
  EQPVAR, EQPFIXS,
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
/;
MODEL TRANSPORTf    transport block with fiscal incentives for clean fuels
 /EQ9PRICE, EQ8PRICE, EQ7PRICE, EQ6APRICE, EQ6BPRICE, EQ5PRICE, EQ4PRICE, EQ3PRICE,
  EQ2PRICE, EQ2BPRICE,
  EQDEM9, EQBUDG8, EQDEM8, EQBUDG7, EQDEM7, EQBUDG6, EQDEM6A, EQDEM6B, EQBUDG5,
  EQDEM5, EQBUDG4, EQDEM4, EQBUDG3, EQDEM3, EQBUDG2, EQDEM2PU, EQDEM2PR, EQBUDG1,
  EQDEM1RC, EQDEM1TR, EQDUMMY,
  EQDEPRO, EQDEPROB, EQCAPCO, EQCAPCOB, EQSCRAPM, EQVOLD, EQDEPRN, EQCAPCN, EQNCPC,
  EQPVARF, EQPFIXS,
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
/;
MODEL TRANSPORTT    transport block with purchase incentives PTAX
 /EQ9PRICE, EQ8PRICE, EQ7PRICE, EQ6APRICE, EQ6BPRICE, EQ5PRICE, EQ4PRICE, EQ3PRICE,
  EQ2PRICE, EQ2BPRICE,
  EQDEM9, EQBUDG8, EQDEM8, EQBUDG7, EQDEM7, EQBUDG6, EQDEM6A, EQDEM6B, EQBUDG5,
  EQDEM5, EQBUDG4, EQDEM4, EQBUDG3, EQDEM3, EQBUDG2, EQDEM2PU, EQDEM2PR, EQBUDG1,
  EQDEM1RC, EQDEM1TR, EQDUMMY,
  EQDEPRO, EQDEPROB, EQCAPCO, EQCAPCOB, EQSCRAP, EQVOLD, EQDEPRN, EQCAPCN, EQNCPCT,
  EQPVAR, EQPFIX,
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
/;
MODEL TRANSPOTTM    transport block with purchase incentives PTAX and IeM scheme
 /EQ9PRICE, EQ8PRICE, EQ7PRICE, EQ6APRICE, EQ6BPRICE, EQ5PRICE, EQ4PRICE, EQ3PRICE,
  EQ2PRICE, EQ2BPRICE,
  EQDEM9, EQBUDG8, EQDEM8, EQBUDG7, EQDEM7, EQBUDG6, EQDEM6A, EQDEM6B, EQBUDG5,
  EQDEM5, EQBUDG4, EQDEM4, EQBUDG3, EQDEM3, EQBUDG2, EQDEM2PU, EQDEM2PR, EQBUDG1,
  EQDEM1RC, EQDEM1TR, EQDUMMY,
  EQDEPRO, EQDEPROB, EQCAPCO, EQCAPCOB, EQSCRAPM, EQVOLD, EQDEPRN, EQCAPCN, EQNCPCT,
  EQPVAR, EQPFIXS,
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
/;
MODEL TRANSPORTC    transport block with annual tax TAXEMF based on emiss. factors
 /EQ9PRICE, EQ8PRICE, EQ7PRICE, EQ6APRICE, EQ6BPRICE, EQ5PRICE, EQ4PRICE, EQ3PRICE,
  EQ2PRICE, EQ2BPRICE,
  EQDEM9, EQBUDG8, EQDEM8, EQBUDG7, EQDEM7, EQBUDG6, EQDEM6A, EQDEM6B, EQBUDG5,
  EQDEM5, EQBUDG4, EQDEM4, EQBUDG3, EQDEM3, EQBUDG2, EQDEM2PU, EQDEM2PR, EQBUDG1,
  EQDEM1RC, EQDEM1TR, EQDUMMY,
  EQDEPRO, EQDEPROB, EQCAPCO, EQCAPCOB, EQSCRAPM, EQVOLD, EQDEPRN, EQCAPCN, EQNCPC,
  EQPVAR, EQPFIXC,
  EQCAPUT, EQTTIME, EQTTIMES, EQTIMEPU,
  EQFEFF1, EQFEFF1B, EQFEFF3, EQFEFF4, EQFEFF5, EQFEFF6, EQFEFF7, EQFEFF8, EQFEFFCOLD,
  EQFEF1, EQFEF2, EQFEF3, EQFEFFC1, EQFEFFC2
/;